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Intermediaries are key actors that facilitate, and sometimes drive, migration within and across 
borders. By providing information and extending critical services in many stages of migration 
and  in  places  of  origin,  transit  and  destination,  legitimate  intermediaries  build  migrants’ 
capabilities  and  expand  their  range  of  choice  —  the  very  essence  of  human  development. 
However their value is, in many cases, overshadowed by the costs they impose on migrants, from 
charging exorbitant fees to outright abuse of basic human rights. Clearly, there is much room for 
intervention to shape intermediaries’ operations in more positive directions.  Available policy 
levers  are  many,  from  imposing  a  system  of  regulation  to  fostering  government-mediated 
migration. In weighing these policy options, there is rarely a bright line separating legitimate 
services and reasonable costs on one hand, and exploitative fees or practices on the other. This 
can be addressed by adopting a framework that recognizes the importance of identifying the 
nature of scarcity and recognizing how migrants can best overcome the constraints of scarce 
information, access and employment opportunities.  Success will also depend on introducing 
parallel  efforts  centered  on  empowering  migrants,  monitoring  the  intermediating  industries, 
building institutional capacity and drafting migration policies that reflect realities on the ground.  
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The  Human  Development  Research  Paper  (HDRP)  Series  is  a  medium  for  sharing  recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. I.  Introduction  
 
The number of international migrants has doubled since 1965, nearing 200 million — a 
population that would constitute the 11
th largest country in the world if they all lived in 
one place.
1 Migration within borders is thought to be much large r; China alone has an 
estimated 140 million  internal migrants.
1 Facilitating and sometimes driving this huge 
migration flow are intermediaries who recruit and guide migrants through the shoals of 
immigration policies and the difficulties of transit, who ma tch employers and workers, 
who provide information about living and working conditions in distant locations — and 
some of whom mislead and abuse their ―clients‖.   
 
These intermediaries include informal social networks, recruitment agencies and their 
chains of subagents, travel agencies, legal advisers and similar businesses. Those that 
provide clandestine services such as unauthorized travel are labeled smugglers. Those 
whose actions are not only clandestine but abusive fall into the category of traffickers, 
whose ‗product‘ has been characterized as modern-day slavery.  
 
Legitimate  intermediaries  fulfill  an  important  role  —  bridging  the  gap  between 
employers or sponsors and prospective migrants. Despite the advance of globalization, 
significant barriers to mobility remain, not only at the international level but also, in some 
cases,  domestically.  At  one  extreme  are  outright  restrictions  on  mobility,  such  as 
restrictive immigration policies and limits on rural to urban migration. Even in cases 
where migration is allowed, information and resource gaps can also constrain movement. 
Labor migrants, for instance, may not have the best information on jobs at destination or 
the financial and social capital to support a move.   
 
                                                           
1 This reflects a near doubling of world population in the same period rather than a sharp increase in mobility; 
the proportion of world population who are international migrants has remained nearly constant — but the 
increase in the sheer number of people on the move creates an enormous role for migration intermediaries.  
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By providing information and extending critical services in many stages of migration and 
in  places  of  origin,  transit  and  destination,  legitimate  intermediaries  build  migrants‘ 
capabilities and expand their range of choice. In the best of cases, intermediaries allow 
migrants the opportunity to move and pursue a life of meaning — the very essence of 
human  development.    From  this  perspective,  intermediaries  become  agents  of 
development.  
However, the services intermediaries provide come at a cost. It is difficult to draw a clear 
line between a reasonable fee for valuable services and exploitative charges or practices, 
or between exploitation and criminal abuse. Numerous accounts of intermediaries taking 
advantage of the migrants they purport to serve suggest the need for more intervention in 
intermediaries‘ operations.  
 
Available policy levers  are many, from  imposing a system  of  regulation to  fostering 
government-mediated  migration.  The  success  of  these  interventions,  however,  will 
depend  on  parallel  efforts  centered  on  empowering  migrants,  monitoring  the 
intermediating industries, building institutional capacity and drafting migration policies 
that reflect realities on the ground. 
 
Far from losing their relevance, intermediaries are likely to remain important actors in the 
movement of people in an immensely inter-connected world divided by porous and often 
arbitrary borders.  The goal of public policy should be focused not only on minimizing 
the  costs  intermediaries  impose  on  migrants  but  also  on  engaging  them  as  potential 
agents of human development.  
II. Who are the intermediaries?  
 
Globalization provides opportunities for a wide range of migration intermediaries.  Some 
operate formal legal businesses regulated by governments, while others exist in a parallel 
yet connected world of informal, semi-legal or even outright criminal recruiters. They 
operate in origin, transit and destination countries and facilitate many types of movement,  
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from  legal  permanent  migration  to  outright  trafficking.  These  intermediaries  may  be 
roughly categorized into five groups.  
1. Social Networks 
 
The  first  group,  and  one  of  the  most  studied,  is  made  up  of  social  networks  —  a 
prospective migrant‘s relatives, friends, neighbors and others connected to him/her by 
social, cultural or economic bonds. Many scholars have long recognized that migration is 
deeply embedded in social relations. As Charles Tilly argued in the early 1990s, it is not 
individuals or even households who engage in migration, but groups of people who have 
kinship, professional or other ties.
2   
 
Academic and policy literature on migration recognizes these social networks as one of 
the key ―engines of immigration‖, providing critical information, resources and logistical 
support.
3 In Bangladesh, for instance, about 55 to 60 percent of recruitment is conducted 
through individual initiatives and social networks. Usually, persons already deployed in 
the host countries arrange visas for their friends and relatives through their own contacts.
4  
Likewise, about 36 percent of Polish immigrants in the United Kingdom found their jobs 
because they knew someone who already worked for their employer.
5 Half of garment 
industry workers in Argentina are Bolivian due to the sector‘s heavy reliance on social 
networks to find jobs.
6 Likewise in Fujian, China, majority of migrants take the initiative 
to contact kinship networks and social groups in order to migrate.
7  
 
Studies suggest that these informal networks have fueled and sustain migration in major 
corridors, like the Mexico-United States corridor.
8 As the network theory of mi gration 
argues, initial migration flows typically experience more significant struggles to adapt. 
Subsequent  flows,  however,  have  an  easier  time  because  of  improved  access  to 
information from their predecessors.
9  As migrant networks develop, norms become 
institutionalized, some of which decrease the costs of migration. Networks can also serve 
to reinforce and even increase migration flows despite changes to the circumstances that 
caused the original migration, by creating a situation of path dependency, or  factors that 




2. Private Recruitment Agencies and their Chain of Sub-agents 
 
Complementing  and,  in  many  cases,  supplanting  social  networks  are  relatively  more 
formal and organized intermediaries whose primary occupation is recruitment. Foremost 
among this second group are private recruitment agencies, some of whom are licensed by 
their  governments  while  others  are  not.  As  the  International  Labor  Organization 
acknowledges, very few industries in the world have changed their image as markedly as 
the recruitment and placement industry. Private recruiters now play a crucial role in the 
effective operation of global and internal labor markets. Businesses are now searching for 
more flexible and mobile staff, while workers are eager to move across national and state. 
Within  this  new  environment,  recruitment  agencies  have  extended  their  business 
activities and increased their market share. The International Confederation of Private 
Employment Agencies records over 9.5 million workers using private agencies to find 
jobs, enhancing their employability and keeping them in touch with the job market and 
training opportunities.
11 
Recruitment agencies play an especially vital role in the placement of w orkers abroad. 
For instance, agencies account for the majority of deployment from Asia, especially from 
the Philippines, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
12  Their extent of operation varies across 
countries. A survey of foreign nurses in the UK, for instance, found  that two thirds were 
recruited through agencies. However, while nearly all nurses from the Philippines and 
South Africa used an agency, very few nurses from countries in sub -Saharan Africa did. 
The study also found that most Filipino nurses moved through Philippines-based agencies 
while others typically used agencies based internationally or in the UK.  
For the past two decades, the increasing need to provide services to a rapidly growing and 
flexible internal labor market has also led to the increased use  of private recruitment 
agencies  within  countries.  While  they  have  long  complemented  the  traditional 
employment market, they are now considered as a ―catalyst for new forms of human 
resource management services and can be contributors to better working conditions.‖
13   
Interestingly, the ILO formally recognized the role of recruiters only in 1997 when it 




14 In 1997, private agencies represented 80 per cent of all  movements of labor 
from Asia to the Arab States. In Europe, the growth of jobs provided by temporary work 
agencies was estimated at 10 per cent a year from 1991 to 1998.
 15 The ILO attributes 
private recruitment agencies‘ rapid growth to the ―changing and flexible labor market, 
constraints in the operations of public employment services and the use of other networks 
for placement.‖
16 
Private recruitment agencies rarely work on their own, but rather use a host of mostly 
informal  sub-agents  or  brokers  to  find  prospective  migrants  or  employers,  creating 
additional layers of intermediaries. Most Bangladeshi recruitment agencies work with 
brokers in destination countries, many of them Bangladeshi, Indian or Pakistani. These 
brokers typically work for factories looking for employees from overseas.
17 At the same 
time, private recruitment agencies also work with local sub-agents, known colloquially as 
dalals, who find and refer prospective migrants from villages and areas far from city-
centers.
18 Essentially the intermediaries of intermediaries, sub-agents or brokers are not 
formally connected to the agencies they work with and rarely are accountable to them or 
to the migrants they eventually help to deploy.  
3. Quasi-intermediaries 
Another group of intermediaries are primarily involved in other business activities and 
engage in recruitment part time or clandestinely. For lack of a better term, this third 
group can be described as quasi-intermediaries, for in many ways they are like other 
intermediaries in all but name. For instance, country-of-origin governments typically bar 
travel  agencies  from  engaging  in  recruitment.  However,  field  studies  in  Brazil, 
Bangladesh and the Philippines reveal that many travel agents facilitate migration despite 
the ban.
19  
Another example within this group is temporary staffing agencies.  Employers outsource 
their workforce to these agencies, which place locals as well as migrants. Unlike other 
intermediaries, these agencies are not just recruiters but essentially act as employers as 
well. Temporary staffing agencies have been growing in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Their sole purpose is to post workers from the EU‘s eight new accession countries —  
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Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
— to work temporarily in various companies within the European Union.
20 
Other  examples  of  quasi -intermediaries  are  modeling  and  entertainment  agencies, 
immigration  lawyers  and  firms,  refugee -assistance  centers  and  cultural  exchange 
programs  —  and  even  hospitals.  As  will  be  discussed  later,  governments  and 
international and non-profit organizations can also be included in this group.   
4. Smugglers 
 
While  the  first  three  groups  sometimes  straddle  the  grey  zone  between  legality  and 
illegality,  the  fourth  group  operates  a  bit  further  down  the  continuum,  somewhere 
between illegality and outright criminal activity. Smugglers move hundreds of thousands 
of people across borders worldwide each year.
21 One estimate suggests that annually, 
some 800,000 people are smuggled across borders.
22 The phenomenon, however, is more 
pronounced in some corridors. For instance, a 2006 study found that in the United States, 
around 73 percent of all newly arrived migrants from Mexico are undocumented; an 
estimated  74  percent  of  them  hired  a  ―coyote‖  to  help  them  navigate  the  border 
crossing.
23   
In 2004, a new protocol to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UN 
TOC)  dealing  with  smuggling  came  into  force.    The  Smuggling  Protocol  defines 
"smuggling of migrants" as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident" (Article 3).
24 
Human smuggling basically involves the ―willing participation‖ of a client to migrate 
abroad  without  authorization.
25  The term commonly invokes consensual transactions 
where the smuggler and the smuggled person decide to evade immigration control to 
achieve mutually gainful objectives. Harvard‘s Jacqueline Bhabha noted this definition 
includes two important ingredients: illegal border crossing by the smuggled person and 




Given that smuggling is an underground and covert operation, it is difficult to completely 
understand its true scale and nature.  For instance, since the early 1990‘s, immigration 
officials within the United States have associated smugglers with organized crime and 
street gangs.  This connection is based on the premise that ―human smuggling requires 
organizational structures and sets of activities, not just individual endeavors‖.
27  
For  some  scholars,  however,  most  smuggling  operations  are  operated  by 
―entrepreneurial‖ individuals from social and familial networks, not gang leaders. For 
instance,  in  the  case  of  smuggling  from  China,  Willard  Myers  noted  that  ―Chinese 
transnational criminal activity is carried out as a form of entrepreneurial activity by and 
among persons who are linked by language (dialect group) and lineage (ancestral birth 
place), who may or may not be a member or affiliate of an organization recognized by 
law  enforcement‖.
28  In  another  study,  authors  Sheldon  Zhang  and  Ko-Lin  Chin 
concluded  that  ―most  alien  smugglers  are  otherwise  ordinary  citizens  whose  familial 
networks and fortuitous social contacts have enabled them to pool resources to transport 
human cargoes around the world‖.
29 
Irrespective of their criminal orientation, from the perspective of migrants with no or very 
limited  access  to  legal  channels,  smugglers  provide  essential  and  desirable  services.  
However, as many observers have argued, these services usually come at a high cost, 
often to the point of being exploitative.  
5. Traffickers  
 
Unlike  smugglers,  traffickers  are  clearly  criminal  actors.  They  move  an  estimated 
800,000-900,000 people a year into forced labor or slavery-like conditions.
30  The ILO 
placed the stock of trafficked persons in 2005 at 2.4 million, more than half of whom 
were in Asia. 
Unlike smugglers who are seen to work with willing partners to an i llicit or illegal 
enterprise, trafficked individuals did not give their consent and are considered ―victims‖ 
or "survivors".
31  By definition, trafficking involves coercion or deception and is clearly a 
human rights violation.  
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As  with  smuggling,  there  is  a  UN  protocol  on  trafficking.  Trafficking  as  defined 
internationally involves:  
...the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
32 
Trafficking, therefore, involves two components: exploitation and coercion. Coercion is 
not limited to using physical force or mental domination, but extends to "the abuse of a 
position of vulnerability." As Bhabha notes, coercion includes a potentially broad range 
of situations that constitute a position of vulnerability such as poverty, hunger, illness, 
lack of education, and displacement. The  trafficking definition on exploitation include 
exploitative actions that are either sexual (i.e. prostitution of others) or non -sexual (i.e. 
indentured or bonded labor, child labor, or oppressive forms of labor and other ―practices 
similar to slavery.‖)
33 
Interestingly, the protocol remains unclear as to whether prostitution itself constitutes 
exploitation,  reflecting  what  some  considered  as  deeply  polarized  views  within  UN 
Member States on the topic. 
34 For instance, the United States government considers 




Connections Within and Without 
These different intermediaries often work together. For instance, some Philippine-based 
recruitment agencies deploying nurses and teachers collaborate with agencies or brokers 
at the destination, which find employers and also recruit workers on their own. Mexican 
coyotes in regions with a long migratory tradition typically link with sub-agents in the 
United States, such as farm labor contractors, who in turn provide jobs and transportation 
to work sites.
36 Social networks have been known to connect would-be migrants to their 
preferred agencies, brokers and smugglers. In China, migration is often the fruit of  
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cooperation between familial and guanxi or ―non-familial relations‖. Human smuggling 
from  China has  been characterized as  ―essentially a business  of social networking‖
37 
where those involved in the smuggling network could be part of the same social network.  
Studies  involving  female  victims  of  trafficking  even  found  that  some  were  recruited 
through friends or acquaintances already inside a trafficking chain.
38   
 
Intermediaries also work with other actors who have less than direct connections to the 
migration process. For instance, in Ecuador, travel agencies work with moneylenders to 
advance  funds  needed  for  migration  and  to  supply  counterfeit  documents.
39  In  El 
Salvador, micro-lending programs have been known to finance migration. While personal 
loans to pay coyotes are not part of their mission, micro lenders have saved some families 
from foreclosure on their land resulting from the exorbitant interest rates some coyotes 
charge  on  delayed  payment  for  their  services.
40  In  Italy  and  Germany,  brokers  of 
caregivers have arrangements with drivers of the numerous minibus companies that travel 
across  and  within  borders  to  advise  their  migrant  customers  to  use  a  particular 
intermediary.
41  
In Pakistan, smugglers work with brokers, suppliers or forgers of passports and visas, 
airline staff and immigration officials at airports, as well as third parties who hold the 
payment until the journey is complete. Even more actors are involved  in journeys with 
significant layovers in transit countries, or overland travel.
42  
Ko-lin Chin‘s analysis of human smuggling from China vividly paints the complexity of 
actors  behind  a  smuggling  operation.      In  Chinese  parlance,  the  main  agent  of  the 
smuggling operation is a ―snakehead‖ and unauthorized immigrants are called ―snake 
people‖.  Human  smuggling  from  China  involves:    big  snakeheads  who    arrange  and 
invest money and other resources; little snakeheads who recruit migrants; transporters 
who assist migrants to their destinations; corrupt public officials who are bribed into 
obtaining official travel documents; guides and crew members who assist migrants in 
transit;    enforcers  who  work  mainly  on  ships  to  manage  and  police  migrant  social 
behavior and order; support personnel who  provide food and clothing to migrants; and 




III.  Value vs. Cost: Intermediaries and their Role in Human Development  
 
Despite this diversity among intermediaries, all except those who deceive and exploit 
migrants satisfy an overarching goal — bridging the gap between employers or sponsors 
and  prospective  migrants.  Despite  globalization,  this  gap  has  remained  significant, 
allowing intermediaries to assume important roles.  Unlike in trade and capital markets, 
there is still significant friction in labor markets across and, in some cases, even within 
borders. For instance, due to restrictive immigration policy at destination or inadequate 
financial  and  social  capital  at  origin,  many  people  do  not  have  even  the  minimal 
capabilities required to exercise their desire to move.  
Intermediaries provide information and critical services that build on migrants‘ limited 
capabilities. In doing so, they expand migrants‘ range of choice, increasing the possibility 
that they will be able to pursue lives that they value. From this perspective, intermediaries 
can be seen as agents of human development.   
Intermediaries‘  value  extends  beyond  the  initial  recruitment  phase  and  covers  many 
stages of migration. They provide migrants with information, assistance and many kinds 




Many  prospective  migrants  have  incomplete  and  imperfect  information  about  job 
opportunities and living conditions abroad. At the same time, employers in receiving 
countries are looking for efficient ways to fill vacancies with migrant workers but often 
have very little knowledge about appropriate candidates. Intermediaries play an important 
role in filling this information gap. Social networks are excellent sources of information, 
ranging from names of employers seeking workers to safer modes of travel to housing 
options at various destinations.
44   
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Recruitment  agencies  in  the  Philippines  typically  advertise  openings  abroad  through 
websites, local newspapers and huge bulletin boards posted outside their centrally located 
local offices. Some provide access to databases of employers seeking migrant workers. 
The private H1 Visa Job Corporation, for instance, offers to submit, for an additional fee, 
a job-seeker‘s resume to thousands of US-based employers who purportedly are actively 
seeking foreign workers in many professional fields.
45   
Many US-based immigration lawyers provide information on how to navigate more 
quickly  and  successfully  the  ―metaphorical  maze‖  of  US  immigration  laws  and 
procedures.    These  firms  highlight  what  have  been  described  as  ―process 
opportunities‖— special laws,  procedures,  interpretations, rules,  regulations  and court 
cases  that  can  be  used  to  facilitate  permanent  and  temporary  movement.  Some 
immigration lawyers also train and/or assist companies and/or their recruiters to make 
―wise, ―immigration-friendly‖ hires.‖
46  
2. Matching Assistance  
 
Most intermediaries do not just provide information. They also actively match migrants 
with employers.  Matching can be an expensive, time consuming and tedious process. 
Intermediaries  have  to  screen  job  orders  and  applications,  conduct  interviews,  check 
documents, test workers and draw up contracts.
47  
 
The process can be especially tedious for particular occupations.  For instance, recruiting 
agencies  that  send  nurses  abroad  have  to  evaluate  a  prospective  migrant‘s  formal 
qualifications  and  experience  as  well  as  personal  qualities  and  match  them  with  the 
requirements  of  institutions  abroad.
48  These  agencies  then  arrange  interviews  via 
telecom, video conferencing or in person.  
 
Intermediaries typically use their local knowledge to select the best workers for the job, 
although they may in some cases discr iminate against some applicants for reasons that 
are not related to job skills. For instance, recruiters of agricultural workers in Mexico are 





Recruiters can also play an important role in facilitating migration flows and in matching 
employers and workers within countries. Indeed, substantial information gaps on labor 
market  opportunities  can  exist  between  different  regions  of  a  country.  For  instance, 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century, manufacturing employers in the 
north and north-central United States faced both booming capacity and increasingly tight 
labor supply. Simultaneously, these employers faced growing demand for manufactures 
(both domestically and for export) and decreasing occupational specialization due to the 
mechanization  of  the  industry.  In  response  to  these  forces,  Northern  employers 
―discovered‖ a largely unexploited pool of low-skilled labor among the primarily rural 
African American communities in the South — which at that point was still recovering 
economically  from  the  Civil  War.  Faced  with  limited  prospects  for  socio-economic 
mobility in the South (as Jim Crow laws became widespread) and informed by recruiters 
of plentiful jobs in the North, African Americans began to migrate en masse — first 




Similar dynamics are still evident today. Many of the same informational, geographic and 
skill barriers that make intermediaries necessary for international job matching are also 
widespread  within  countries  or  labor  markets  unified  through  a  common  market 
agreement. According to Julia Henly, formalized job -search intermediaries can range 
from  simple  advertising  agencie s  (often  in  professional  or  trade -specific  media)  to 
placement programs run through welfare offices, community organizations, non -profit 
groups, or private job-search agencies.
51 Their services can include referrals to firms and 
access to demand listings.  
 
Indeed, within the United States, the role of intermediaries in matching employees and 
employers has become more important. Temporary help firms, in particular, have grown 
explosively  (although  they  still  account  to  a  relatively  small  fraction  of  total 
employment.) Interestingly, these firms have clienteles disproportionately weighted to the 
working poor. For example, 15 percent of those employed by temporary help firms in  
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1999 were high school dropouts, and 21 percent were college graduates. The comparable 
figures  for  people  in  traditional  employment  arrangements  were  11  percent  and  31 
percent.  African-Americans  and  Hispanics  accounted  for  34  percent  of  temporary 
workers, compared with 21 percent of people in traditional occupations.  This suggests 




For low-skilled occupations, government welfare agencies and personal networks seem to 
play a more important role than large -scale recruiters. For middle-skilled occupations, 
formal recruitment agencies and individual recruiters have become less prominent and 
have given way to job-matching sites such as monster.com, and professional and personal 
networks (e.g., alumni networks). However, the impact of the rise of Inte rnet job-search 
technology is still ambiguous. Notably, the use of recruitment intermediaries continues to 
be widespread at the extreme upper -end of the labor market  –  for  example  among 
business  executives,  university  administrators,  engineers  and  technology  specialists, 
physicians, architects and lawyers. Here, inter-firm competition and the race for talent 
yield a highly competitive human resources climate. However, for obvious reasons, the 
potential  for  worker  abuse  by  intermediaries  is  much  less  than  among  low-skilled 
workers in an international labor market. And as a result, the argument for government 
intervention is much weaker. 
 
More recently, as technological innovations have spurred the integration of regional labor 
markets,  recruitment  methods  have  become  increasingly  differentiated  by  skill  level 
within many advanced industrial societies. Some researchers suggest that Internet job 
search  software  and  websites  facilitate  better  employer-employee  matches  by 
systematically  bridging  information  gaps
53  while others claim that Internet searches 
simply put very disparate job candidates into the same labor markets, thereby increasing 






3. Logistical Support at Origin 
 
Beyond  information  and  matching,  many  intermediaries  provide  logistics  support  at 
origin. For instance, nurses bound for the United States reportedly wait an average of two 
years for a visa, even after a match is made. Recruitment agencies will fulfill tedious 
legal requirements — aptly called in one study ―institutional checkpoints‖ — such as the 




Likewise, within the European Union, excessive bureaucratization of the process to 
obtain work permits often causes a lag between the availability of workers and the needs 
of companies. This makes direct recruitment of foreign workers from non -EU countries 
very difficult. Construction companies in the Netherlands address this problem by using 




Intermediaries also provide financial support to prospective migrants. Migration almost 
always  requires  significant  initial  investments  which  may  include,  among  others, 
placement or smuggling fees, documentation costs such as passport, police clearance and 
birth certificate fees, and required tests and certifications of medical qualifications and 
other skills.  
 
Instances  of  social  networks  financing  migration  of  relatives  and  friends  are  well 
documented. Looking at Chinese migration to the US, Zhao Liang and his colleagues 
found that individuals chose to borrow money from members of their village at a low or 
even zero interest rate.  Since newly arrived Chinese migrants in  the U.S. work under an 
employer or within a business involving persons from the same village, risk for loan 
default is low.
57  Similarly, one recent study using data from the Mexican Migration 
Survey strongly suggests that loans from relatives tend to cover  payments to coyotes. 
58  
Interestingly, migrants‘ social networks are not only sources of financing; strategically 
connected  networks  can  also  lower  the  cost  of  financing.  A  case  study  of  Chinese  
15 
 
migrants from Fujian found that recruiters typically approach village cadres to obtain 
permission to recruit migrants. The study suggests that persons who have village cadres 




Private recruitment agencies and thei r strings of sub -agents and brokers also provide 
loans, typically paid through a salary deduction scheme. For instance, within India, 
construction workers from Madhya Pradesh typically migrate to neighboring states of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. Until about 2 005, recruitment was largely done by agents 
locally known as mukkaddams.  The mukkaddams provide cash advances to migrants to 
help their families left behind until remittances start to flow.  The advance is also used by 




Aside from financing, other intermediaries also provide necessary training. For example, 
some  Indian  hospitals  have  been  engaging  in  ―business  process  outsourcing‖.  These 
hospitals not only send nurses abroad, but also train and prepare them to take foreign 
nurse examinations. One study of this emerging trend revealed that these hospitals invest 
an average of US$4,000 to US$7,000 to cover training and other related costs and earn as 
much as US$47,000 for every single nurse placed abroad.
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4. Logistical support in transit  
 
Once migrants leave their countries of origin, intermediaries facilitate the actual move 
and provide accommodation while in transit to the final destination.  In the case of Polish 
migration to Germany and Italy, for instance, many transport agencies run small bus lines 
which connect Polish, German and Italian towns, cities or villages. Some recruitment 
agents run their own transport agencies or work together with them to get more customers 
and to ensure that their clients get to the employer at the required time. Many agents who 
arrange jobs and travel to the place of work also maintain accommodation in Germany 
and Italy for newly arrived migrants and for migrants who would like to (for personal  
16 
 




Studies of smuggling operations between Thailand and Myanmar reveal similar roles at 
transit points.  Myanmar brokers usually  transport migrants to the border and Thai 
brokers will receive them on the Thai side. The Thai brokers may deliver them directly 
into the employer or to one agreed location. In the latter arrangement, migrants have to 
locate another broker to find work.
63 
5. Logistical support at destination  
 
Intermediaries continue to provide services at the final destination, sometimes even well-
after migrants started work.  For instance, members of social networks generally help 
migrants‘  find  work  and,  in  some  cases,  assimilate  into  the  society.
64  Hometown 
associations are often seen primarily in terms of their engagement in development in 
countries  of  origin,  but  many  actually  perform  key  intermediation  tasks  such  as 
connecting new migrants to social services, including legal services for help in obtaining 
work authorization and organizations that offer job placement assistance.  For example, a 
2000 study of Ghanaian immigrant associations in Toronto, Canada found that one of 
their main goals was to ease the settlement pr ocess for new arrivals by providing 
assistance in locating housing, employment, and other necessities.  Members would ask 




In Malaysia, Indonesian domestic  workers, regardless of whether they moved through 
legal channels or through a smuggler, often stay with Malaysian agencies or brokers for a 
period typically ranging from one day to two weeks before moving to their employers' 
homes.  In cases where migrants have problems with or were rejected by their employers, 





A study of farm labor contractors in the United States likewise shows that they not only 
arrange jobs for workers, but also offer services such as cash advances, transportation, 
housing, food, drink, false documents and other necessities at the destination. This is 
particularly true in cases where contractors recruit in border towns and places where 
migrants  may  have  limited  or  no  access  to  social  networks.
67  A 2002 study on the 
domestic work industry in Italy and Germany reveals a roughly similar trend.
68  
In  the  Russian  Federation,  where  most  migrant  workers  are  recruited  informally, 
intermediaries typically approach incoming migrants at tr ain or bus stations and offer 
transportation to construction sites and other places that hire migrant workers. As in other 
cases, Russian recruiters also provide a wide range of services, from protection from 
arrest (through bribing the local police) to providing food and accommodation.
69 
A survey of migrants working in Thailand‘s domestic service, agriculture, fishing and 
manufacturing  sectors  also  revealed  that  intermediaries  arrange  remittances  and 
communication to family members back home.  Some recruiters also negotiate better pay 
or working conditions and remove migrants from abusive workplaces. Researchers in this 
study conclude that, contrary to common held beliefs in the region, recruiters are not 
often traffickers but ―in fact play a positive role in terms of maintaining an ongoing 
relationship with the migrants.‖
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Indeed, a study of entrepreneurs in Long Island, New York offers a glimpse of the gamut 
of  services  intermediaries  provide  or  arrange  at  destination:    smuggling  itineraries 
packaged by travel agents, false work and residency documents assembled by notaries, 
and transportation provided by co-workers and neighbors.
71 
Intermediaries at destination do not cater only to undocumented or low-skilled migrants. 
Agencies recruiting teachers, for inst ance, provide a range of services, from help in 
purchasing insurance and finding accommodations to providing no -interest relocation 








The nearly full circle of services intermediaries provide are not given to migrants for free, 
but at a cost that many observers find unbearably high, to the point of being exploitative.  
Private  recruitment  agencies  and  their  sub-agents  have  faced  the  strongest  and  most 
frequent criticism. As noted by the ILO in a report presented to the 85th session of the 
International  Labour  Conference  in  1997,  ―…a  disturbing  number  of  (private 
employment agencies), often not widely known, exploit both workers and the countries 
involved, including the host countries.‖
73 This concern is shared by trade unions. For 
instance,  the  International  Confederation  of  Free  Trade  Unions  (ICFTU)  —  the 
predecessor organization of the International Trade Union Confederation — highlighted 
in a 1997 report the ―modern-day slavery of temporary migrants.‖  The ICFTU report 
cited recruitment agencies‘ wide range of abuses, from offering fictitious job offers to 
mafia style-trafficking.
74  
Even the much celebrated social networks are gaining their share of critics.  Studies have 
documented the less than symmetrical rel ationship between migrants and their social 
networks. Sociologist Sarah Mahler, for instance noted, that assistance within networks 
often comes at a very high price. Stuck near the bottom of the nation‘s labor markets, she 
argued that many immigrants profit at the expense of other migrants in their networks.
75  
In both internal and international labor migration, intermediaries oversee one of the most 
critical junctures: The moment when the terms and conditions of the employer-employee 
relationship are still being negotiated, and when power asymmetries between actors can 
either lead to a mutually beneficial relationship, or to exploitation. In general, concerns 
over  the  actions  of  intermediaries  fall  into  three  areas:    (1)  fees  and  other  types  of 
transaction costs, (2) fraud and (3) human rights abuse.  
1. Fees and other types of transaction costs  
 
Fees are at the center of most recruitment irregularities, with intermediaries charging 
excessive prices, collecting fees too early, or failing to issue receipts.  The level of fees  
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differs depending on many variables, such as the country of destination, nature of work 
and prospective salary.   
 
For instance, research on China suggests that nurses aiming to enter the Australian and 
United  Kingdom  market  pay  recruiters  between  US$4000  and  US$15,000
76  while 
Chinese  construction  workers  bound  for  Japan  and  Singapore  pay  agents  between 
US$3,000 to US$10,000.
77 Female domestic workers, who typically earn between S$200 
(US$ 134) to S$250  (US$ 167) a month, pay about S$600 (U S$ 403), or  three months 
salary, to recruitment agents to get contracts in Singapore.
78 Teachers recruited to the 
United States pay between 7 to 15 percent of annual salary as a placement fee, on top of 
documentation and training costs.
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Khalid Koser‘s study of smuggling from Pakistan suggests that, depending on routes and 
destination,  smugglers  ask  between  US$3,000  to  US$20,000.
80  Smuggling fees from 
China to the United States are much higher, reported at various sources to be ranging 
from US$30,000 to US$70,000.
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In general, migrants pay higher recruiting fees if the job carries prospects for settlement 
abroad, if it is difficult to migrate via social networks or illegally, and if there are far 
more workers seeking to go abroad than there are contracts available.
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Studies have shown that excessive fees levied on prospective migrants are often the first 
step into the cycle of dependency and coercion.
83  In order to pay recruitment and 
processing fees, migrants may take out large loans requiring repayment at extremely high 
interest rates or agree to a salary deduction scheme that holds the first three to five 
months of salary as payment. There are even cases in which intermediaries collect 
security bonds and housing or property certificates from migrants before their departures, 






2. Fraud  
 
Fraud and deceit are also believed to be common. Some intermediaries do not provide 
complete and honest information about job responsibilities, work conditions, or where 
and how migrants can turn for help while at the destination.  
 
Some pay migrants less than the agreed amount. For instance, within India, workers from 
Western Orissa are usually recruited to work in other states by an agent or contractor 
known as a Sardar or Khatadar. At the time of recruitment, Sardars give the worker an 
advance and promise a wage which is to be adjusted against the advance at the end of 
every month. But this promise is rarely kept. Brick kiln workers are usually paid Rs 175-
200 for 1,000 bricks made and typically work for 12 to 15 hours — and sometimes, up to 
18 hours a day to make more money. Wages are settled at the end of the brick-making 
season and research found that Sardars typically cheat the illiterate migrants.
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Indeed, underpayment seems to be evident am ong internal migrants working in other 
parts of India.  Another example is in Andra Pradesh, where companies typically pay the 
agent and not the migrant workers. A 2008 field study found that migrants were receiving 
the equivalent of Rs 1200 per month in cash and food even though the agents or mestris 
received Rs 4500 per month from the employer.
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Other intermediaries arrange for jobs that do not exist or falsify documents that can 
endanger  migrants‘  status  at  the  destination.  For  instance,  recruitment  agencies  in 
Bangladesh usually process a large number of passports at any given time. There are 
cases  where  agents  sign  the  forms  on  migrants‘  behalf  placing  them  at  risk  at  the 




Some agencies bypass checking systems for work permits and transport migrants under 
improper visas. Cases of professionals, particularly in the health sector, leaving under 
student visas have been documented. In Bangladesh, where the sale of visas is rampant,  
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there have been documented cases of a visa being sold to a worker other than the one to 
whom it was issued. The migrant bearing the fraudulent visa becomes an undocumented 
worker at the destination.
88  
 
Others open centers tha t offer phony professional examination training.  There are 
multiple instances of Filipina nurses bound for the United States who pay significant 
tuition  fees  to  agency -run  centers  that  purportedly  train  for  the  National  Council 
Licensure Examination-Registered Nurse or NCLEX-RN, one of the tests required for 
employment as nurses in US health establishments.
89  
 
Fraud affects even the highly-skilled and extends to developed destination countries. An 
in-depth study of international nurse recruitment in the United States revealed the myriad 
problems migrant nurses suffer at the hands of recruiters:
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  Agencies  collect  payments  from  nurses  for  testing  or  travel  and  then  never 
reappear to follow through on commitments. 
  Some nurses sign contracts to work with a particular employer and, upon arrival, 
learn that they must work for another employer. 
  Some nurses are told that they will work as direct hires and, upon arrival, learn 
that they are assigned to a staffing agency. 
  Contracts are sometimes ―sold‖ to another agency; nurses are then forced to work 
in the new agency‘s hospital or nursing home.  
  Some  nurses  who  have  been  promised  reimbursement  of  test  fees  and  travel 
expenses never receive the funds. 
  Nurses told that their temporary permit and Social Security number (SSN) would 
be ready upon their arrival in the United States sometimes find that the documents 
are not yet available. As a result, payment for work is delayed until issuance of 
the SSN, leaving the nurses with no option but to work as clerks for $12 an hour 




3. Human Rights Abuse 
 
There are also numerous reports, mostly from migrant NGOs, of agencies confiscating 
passports  and  forcing  workers  to  stay  with  abusive  employers.  In  the  worst  cases, 
migrants are harassed sexually or deprived of food and other vital necessities while in 
transit and at destination.  
 
One  case  in  Indonesia  involved  months-long  confinement  in  overcrowded  training 
centers run by recruitment agencies. The prospective migrants were reportedly trapped in 
heavily-guarded centers for three to six months without any income.
91 Another study of 
Chinese  migrants  in  the  United  States  found  that  smugglers  sometimes  hire  gang 
members to force migrants to pay long -standing debts and even compel women into 
prostitution. Many migrants in the restaurant and garment industries reported working 
long hours and living in crowded tenements.  Research also found that many suffer from 
physical and mental exhaustion due to sweatshop-like conditions.
92   
 
News accounts of smugglers operating overcrowded, rickety boats and cargo containers, 
sometimes resulting in the deaths of their passengers, point to dangers of smuggling.   
Research  suggests  that  smugglers  are  keen  to  move  several  people  at  once  because 
bribery is typically the same for one person as for several. It also increases the chances 
that at least one would arrive safely, allowing smugglers to recoup their initial outlay.
93   
 
As Jacqueline Bhabha notes, some of those fortunate enough to reach their destination 
find themselves locked in cycles of violence, exploitation, and abuse. Victims‘ fear of 
arrest  and  deportation  coupled  with  retribution  by  smuggling  gangs  led  to  the 
underreporting of these violations.
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A study on internal migration in India show that abuses do occur even wi thin internal 
labor markets. Priya Deshingkar  and Shaheen Akter  cite the various ways in which 
migrant construction workers  within India are exploited by their agents or  mestries, 
ranging  from  trapping  them  in  bonded  labour  by  paying  less  than  subsistence  level,  
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extracting overtime and child labour and using ―caste based and patriarchal modes of 
oppression  to  maintain  exploitative  labour  relations.‖  The  authors  conclude  that  the 
migrant workers are aware of the exploitation but still choose to use an agent due to lack 
of information for finding jobs independently. There is a belief that the mestries will 
―help them during times of difficulty‖ because of what the authors describe as the ―feudal 
history of the region and their faith in patron-client relationships.‖
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IV. Policy Options 
 
Paradoxically, migration is the most restricted but least regulated factor-of-production 
flow (relative to traded goods and financial capital). Unilateral migration management 
tightly limits labor mobility channels but, within those channels, government policy is 
often  laissez-faire  in  relation  to  the  intermediaries.  An  accounting  of  intermediaries‘ 
value  and  cost  to  prospective  migrants  strongly  suggest  that  this  hands-off  approach 
merits  serious  revision.    Clearly,  there  is  much  room  for  intervention  to  shape 
intermediaries‘ operations in more positive directions.  
 
Current policy and academic discussions points to three potential areas of intervention:  
(1) control the intermediaries, (2) help their efforts to self-regulate, or (3) bypass profit-
oriented intermediaries altogether.  The appropriate policy interventions depend on the 
nature of the scarcity in the labor market, a concept that will be discussed at length in 
Chapter 5 of this paper.  
 
A. Control the intermediaries  
Since intermediaries are often in a very powerful position, one way to curb abuse is to 
control their leverage against migrants. This can be achieved by creating checks in four 
fronts:  (1)  regulation,  (2)  stricter  enforcement  and  border  control  efforts  and  (3) 





1. Regulation  
 
Regulation repeatedly comes up as a potentially effective tool of government control.  
Governments may register and/or license agencies. Registration required that agencies 
make  themselves  known  to  a  government  authority,  while  licensing  entails  the  prior 
authorization of an agency before starting business. Some cases will justify registration 
only while some may require a licensing system. 
 
The  benefits  of  regulation  through  licensing  are  threefold.  First,  it  allows  for  a  pre-
screening of the applicants‘ capabilities and professional experience in job placement 
activities.  Second,  it  creates  transparency  by  identifying  agencies  and  their  overall 
activities. Third, a licensing system facilitates record-keeping not only of the basic and 
critical  information,  such  as  agencies‘  business  addresses,  but  also  on  the  types  of 
services that agencies offer clients.
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The ILO recommends that, if a system of registration is adopted, agencies should at th e 
very least be registered as a special category of private business to avoid malpractice and 
abuse of clients. The ILO argues that although agencies ―in general, operate as a normal 
private business, their activities and operations relate to people wishing to find suitable 
employment. Services  related to  human resource management are unlike a brokerage 
business; they require specific skills and an understanding of human beings with their 
different needs, aspirations and idiosyncrasies.‖
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Scope of Regulation  
 
The types of recruitment services that agencies perform or the sectors in which they focus 
operations will typically determine the scope of licensing. For example, several countries 
regulate temporary work agencies, while others focus on recruiters of workers abroad or 
those that provide services beyond placement. Indeed, a number of countries regulate 
only certain types of agencies. Table 1 provides some examples of such countries and the 





Table 1: Scope of Government Regulation 
Country  Scope of Regulation  
Austria  Temporary work agencies 
Belgium  Temporary work agencies 
China  Overseas employment 
France  Temporary work agencies 
Germany  Temporary work agencies 
Indonesia  Overseas employment 
Italy  Temporary work agencies 
Philippines  Overseas employment 
Poland  Temporary work agencies 
Portugal  Temporary work agencies 
Spain  Temporary work agencies 
UK  Labor providers in agriculture 
Source: International Labor Organization 
 
Do’s and Don’ts in a Regulatory System  
 
Most regulatory systems allow origin and destination governments to set parameters in 
two critical areas: the minimum requirements for permission to recruit workers legally 
and operational guidelines, including maximum fees.   
a) Entry Requirements  
 
Entry requirements vary by country.  In general, regulators require agencies to prove 
competence in four areas:  financial capacity, personal and professional qualifications, 
and management and marketing capabilities.  
Among countries of origin, the Philippines has the most sophisticated regulatory system 
in place.  It has regulated recruitment agencies since 1974 and is widely recognized as 
having one of the most effective government bureaucracies in place to manage migration.  
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In  2008,  nearly  1.4  million  Filipinos  left  the  country  to  work  in  more  than  190 
destinations, each bearing an employment contract issued by the Philippine government. 
About 95 percent of this labor flow used licensed, private recruitment agencies based in 
the Philippines. For many international observers, the Philippines‘ system of regulating 
migration has unrivaled sophistication, making it a model for other developing countries 
hoping to access the benefits of global labor mobility.
99 
The Philippines enforces a set of entry requirements desi gned to weed out potential 
violators.  To acquire an operating license, agency owners in the Philippines must have: 
  Filipino citizenship or partnerships in which 75 percent of the capital is Filipino-
owned  or  controlled.  This  ensures  that  agencies  are  within  the  Philippine 
government‘s jurisdiction should litigation be necessary. 
  No  criminal records or complaints, charges and convictions  related to illegal 
recruitment 
  Financial stability. Agencies have to  prove they have at  least  2 million pesos 
(US$44,400) as capital, pay registration fees, and post bonds: one in the form of a 
bank  deposit  under  an  escrow  account  of  1  million  pesos  (US$22,200)  and  a 
surety bond of 100,000 pesos (US$2,200). The escrow deposit covers valid and 
legal money claims of recruited workers and must remain intact at all times to 
keep the license valid. 
  Deployment capacity demonstrated by proof of manpower requests for not less 
than 100 workers.  
  Access to new markets by partnering with foreign employers that did not employ 
Filipino workers for at least six months prior to the agency‘s application. 
  A  panel  interview  that  successfully  confirms  and/or  clarifies  submitted 
information. In these interviews, agencies, especially those deploying household 
workers and entertainers, may be required to show additional proof of capital, 
such as a deed of sale and mortgage and bank statements. 
 
Some  of  these  requirements,  along  with  other  provisions,  figure  in  other  countries‘ 
regulatory  systems.  Germany  conducts  criminal  checks  and  has  minimum  financial  
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requirements. However, it also requires agency owners to have at least three years of 
work  which  involved  tasks  in  the  field  of  personnel  management,  job  placement, 
personnel consultation or the supply of temporary workers.  Applicants must also have a 
recognized  vocational  qualification  or  a  degree  from  a  university  or  other  higher 
education establishment.
 100 Qatar also requires a bank guarantee as well as disqualifies 
applicants employed in a government agency or any public body or company owned by 
the state.
101 Singapore gives license to applicants that are at least 25 years old, have 




Annex 1 shows a range of entry requirements found in a number of countries.  
 
b) Operational Guidelines 
 
Regulators can also set operational guidelines in three areas: limits on fees and adoption 
of joint liability provisions and standard contracts. 
1) Limits on Fees 
 
Since most of recruitment irregularities are fee-related, a number of governments have set 
limits on the placement fees recruitment agencies can legally charge clients.  The limits 
vary quite considerably by country and, interestingly, by sector.  
 
Some regulations set  limits  as  a percentage of salary.  The actual amount  set  out  in 
legislation vary from 5, 10 or 15 per cent of the initial monthly wage up to 5 per cent of 
the first gross annual wage. For instance, in the Philippines, agencies can charge up to 
100 percent of a migrant‘s first month‘s salary. Malaysia, Singapore and Zimbabwe set 
the ceiling much lower, at just 15, 10 and 5 percent respectively.
103 Switzerland allows 
agencies to charge up to 5 percent of the annual salary while Egypt set the limit at just 2 
percent.  Israel, on the other hand, limits placement fees to 120 percent of the minimum 
monthly wage or around US$ 900.




Other  governments  set  limits  depending  on  a  migrant‘s  skill  level  or  sector.  India 
implements a set of differentiated fees depending on type of worker, ranging from $US 
45 for unskilled workers and up to US$220 for the highly skilled.
105 The Philippines 
exempts from its placement fee policy all seafarers and domestic helpers as well as land-
based workers whose destination countries prohibits — either by law, policy, or practice 
— the charging or collection of placement and recruitment fees.
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One such country is Ireland, where all recruitment -related costs must be borne by the 
employers. 
107 Interestingly five of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) States  —  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  Oman,  Bahrain  and  Kuwait  —  also  explicitly 
prohibit charging placement fees from workers.  The other GCC country, the United Arab 
Emirates  (UAE),  likewise  bans  recruiters  from  charging  migrants  but  allows  certain 
exceptions to agents that can obtain special government consent.
108 This ban, however, 
only apply to agencies operating within the GCC states and not to foreign recruiters.  
 
There is no clear consensus internationally on whether a complete ban on placement and 
other fees is ultimately a good policy. Even the ILO, which once prohibited charging any 
fees  to  employees,  has  softened  its  stance.  Citing  a  ―different  environment‖,  ILO‘s 
Convention 181 allowed exceptions to be determined individually by member states.
109 
Generally,  charging  fees  to  wor kers  is  prohibited  in  industrialized  countries  where 
temporary work agencies dominate the private employment market, such as in all of the 
EU-15  countries.  Other  countries  with  significant  numbers  of  overseas  recruitment 
agencies allow the collection of fe es to select categories of workers or regulate the 
amount of fees to be charged. There are also countries that do not regulate fees at all and 
leave them to the discretion of the agencies.
110 For a sample of these countries, see Table 
2 above. 
 
Governments tend to limit fees that can be legally charged to migrants, but very few have 
extended similar protection to employers. For instance, Singapore prohibits agencies 
from charging employers more than the stipulated registration fee of S$5 and 80 per cent  
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of the worker‘s first-month earnings.
111 This is a critical policy oversight given that field 
studies show employers‘ tendency to eventually pass on their costs to migrants. 
 
2. Joint Liability 
 
Another  potentially  effective  operational  requirement  that  rarely  comes  up  in  policy 
discussions but deserves special mention is the idea of joint liability.  In the Philippines, 
every licensed recruitment agency is liable jointly with and separately from the foreign 
employer. In other words, if the foreign employer fails to comply with the contract or 
violates  any  of  its  provisions;  the  worker  can,  in  principle,  file  redress  against  the 




In effect,  agencies become integral  tools  of government  control,  connecting not  only 
Philippine workers to foreign employers but also foreign employers to the Philippine 
government.  Through  the  joint-liability  provision,  the  Philippine  government  can 
indirectly  exercise  pressure  on  foreign  employers  who  are,  after  all,  beyond  the 
jurisdiction of the Philippines‘ justice system — a beneficial arrangement for workers 
who would otherwise be left without recourse for unfair treatment.
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3. Standard Contracts  
 
Regulators  can also limit  recruiters‘  ability to  determine the terms and conditions  of 
employment by requiring the use of standard contracts. The standard contracts define the 
terms and conditions of service of migrant workers during their employment abroad. For 
instance, farm labor contractors in the United States who are hiring temporary migrant 
workers through the government‘s H-2A program are required to utilize contracts that 
spell out minimum wages, travel reimbursement, record keeping and minimum standards 
for housing.  Canada has similar protections and standards regarding allowable wage 






According  to  the  ILO,  many  countries  have  developed  model  employment  contracts. 
Although  they  are  not  always  mandatory,  they  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  prospective 
employers  and  workers  in  the  formalization  of  the  employment  agreement.  The  ILO 




  Description of the job, site of employment and duration of contract; 
  Basic and overtime remuneration; 
  Regular working hours, rest days, holidays; 
  Transportation clauses to country/place of employment, and return; 
  Employment injury and sickness compensation, emergency medical care; 
  Valid contract termination grounds; 
  Settling of dispute clause; 
  Non-cash compensation and work related benefits. 
c) Some Caveats on Regulation 
 
Any  government  attempt  to  regulate  intermediaries  will  doubtlessly  face  many 




Governments  have limited options  when it comes  to  dealing with  matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of other states. Once a worker leaves his or her country of origin, he 
or she will be at the mercy of the laws, traditions, and customs of the destination country. 
Regulating intermediaries is not easy because it requires managing a global movement 
over which the regulator typically does not have complete control. The enforcement of 
worker  protection  rules  in  multiple  legal  jurisdictions,  and  especially  where  the 
regulatory regimes differ dramatically across the jurisdictions, may not be impossible, but  
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it is certainly difficult. For instance, in the case of worker abuse, to what degree should 
the employer or recruiter be held liable? 
 
The country of origin government‘s main objective is to protect and defend their citizens 
working  abroad while the destination country government  may be more interested in 
defending local employers. As already mentioned, the Philippines resolves this dilemma 
by  requiring  all  intermediaries  to  accept  liability  for  worker  abuses.  The  onus  for 
regulating the employer-employee relationship thus falls to the intermediaries who are 
often ill equipped to enforce labor standards effectively.  
 
This policy conundrum of conflicting interests and jurisdictions is, of course, not unique 
to migration and has been addressed, with varying degrees of success, in other fields both 
internationally  and  within  federal  states.  Two  approaches  are  most  common:  (1)  the 
granting of final authority to a supranational or national (in the case of federal states) 
entity, and (2) the establishment of minimum standards through agreements accompanied 
by the creation of monitoring and enforcement bodies and procedures. Perhaps the best 
known example of the latter is the governance system for international trade under the 
World Trade Organization.  
 
However, labor law is much more of a national prerogative and more deeply enshrined in 
domestic  policy  than  is  trade.  As  a  result,  many  states  will  be  reluctant  to  grant 
meaningful  regulatory  authority  to  any  supranational  entity.  At  the  same  time,  many 
countries will be unwilling to accept (and to enforce) binding labor standards for foreign 
workers as part of a formal agreement. The record of dispute resolution mechanisms 
created in bilateral or regional agreements is mixed and depends largely on the good will 
and political commitment of the signatories. Still, one successful example among others 
is the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation.  
 
Since migration — and especially migration via intermediaries — often occurs between 
regions and countries with widely divergent value systems, establishing and enforcing 
regulatory standards through dispute resolution bodies may be difficult. In this respect,  
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partnerships are likely to be easier between countries that share values with respect to 
individual and labor rights. Otherwise, the heavy-handed regulation of recruiters may be 
the only effective option for ensuring a minimum level of labor protection for workers 
abroad — although recruiters may feel that it is not fair to require them to play this role.   
 
Control across states 
 
The issue of control does not figure exclusively in international migration but also affects 
internal  migration.  In  India,  for  instance,  agents  (mukkaddams)  are  required  to  be 
registered  under  the  Inter-state  Migrant  Workmen  Act  (ISMWA)  of  1979.  The  Act 
mandates  all  agents  to  register  themselves  and  their  migrant  worker  clients  with 
designated government authorities. Agents are also required to provide migrant workers 
with decent accommodation, crèche facilities, access to health care and minimum wages.  
However, as Priya Deshingkar and Shaheen Akter note in a forthcoming study, activists 
and researchers of labour laws find that it is extremely difficult to prosecute agents from 





It is also important to note the risk of over-regulation.  Operating in one of the most 
regulated  markets  for  outmigration,  many  Philippines-based  agencies  complain  that 
regulation raises the costs of Filipino migrants ―too much.‖ Most recruiters want less 
government regulation, arguing that it enables recruiters from other countries, particularly 
those from China, Indonesia and Vietnam to erode the competitive position of Filipino 
migrants in the international labor market.
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Not surprisingly, this is a sentiment shared by agencies in other countries.  Participants of 
an  IOM-sponsored  workshop  for  heads  of  the  biggest  organizations  of  recruitment 
agencies in 9 Asian countries ranked ―government policies, rules and regulations‖ as the 





This response from the recruitment industry may well be an indication that regulations do 
work, in part by cutting into the intermediaries‘ profits, which many observers consider 
to be excessive in any case. By raising the bar in terms of standards and work ethic, 
regulation can potentially drive less efficient agencies out of business.  The Philippine 
experience, however, suggests that the opposite scenario maybe also be as probable — 
Philippine agencies that do not make enough profits rarely close shop, but tend to recoup 
their losses by cutting more corners and breaking more rules (i.e., charging exorbitant 
recruitment fees or colluding with employers).
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For  instance,  the  Philippines  introduced  more  stringent  requirements  for  domestic 
workers in 2006, including a provision banning agencies from asking pl acement fees 
from migrants. Within a year of the new policy, deployment of new hires dropped 56 
percent. This translates to about 40,000 individuals who were kept from taking domestic 
work abroad. Migrant organizations are concerned that the policy had the  unintended 
effect of forcing these migrants to take the irregular route.
120  Indeed, the Philippine 
government has seen an increase in domestic workers attempting to leave the country 
under a different occupation, or as tourists, to bypass the new requirements.
121 Consulates 
have also reported instances of domestic workers willingly signing new contracts with 
salaries below the level the government prescribes.
122  Since the new ruling banned 
agencies from charging placement fees and required pre -deployment  training, some 
migrants allege that unscrupulous agencies are now jacking up the training cost to 
recover some of their lost income.
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In a global employment market where stakes are high, cumbersome and rigid regulations 
can easily breed corruption and abuse. Mo re than that, they can force agencies and 
migrants out of the legal system and into irregular channels.  The key challenge is to 
develop a balanced set of regulations that are in tune with realities on the ground and 
stimulate informal recruiters to come forth and establish a legitimate business — not the 
other  way  around.  This  is  an  extremely  difficult  challenge  given  that  informal  labor 
markets, as Ibrahim Awad noted in a study of Egypt, typically do not lend themselves 
easily to government intervention.  
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2. Enforcement and Border Control 
 
Even  a  perfectly  balanced  regulatory  system  is  a  blunt  instrument  without  a 
correspondingly effective enforcement mechanism. Many have noted that governments 
are doing little or no monitoring of intermediaries‘ activities.  Even the Philippines has 
been widely  criticized locally for its  failure to  monitor licensed agencies  adequately, 
impose appropriate penalties and stem illegal recruitment.  
The solution typically put forward, especially in relation to undocumented movement, is 
stronger enforcement  of rules,  especially at  transit points.  This  may mean checks  on 
migrants as they transit in and out of a country. For instance, to ensure workers are 
properly  documented  before  proceeding  to  their  overseas  job  sites,  the  Philippines 
maintains what the government calls ―assistance centers‖ at international airports and 
other exit points. Workers without proper documents cannot leave.   
 
Refugee advocates, however, raised concerns that more stringent border controls runs the 




Studies also imply that, far from stopping undocumented flows, strict border controls can 
have  the  unintentional  effect  of  increasing  migrant  smuggling,  a s  people  resort  to 
unlawful means to cross borders. The more closed borders are, it is argued, the larger the 
role played by smuggling networks and organized crime.
125 Stringent control also forces 
adoption of more dangerous routes that can lead to more abus ive and, in worst cases, 
even fatal practices.  
 
Experience in the US-Mexico border serves as a prime example of this trend.   Since 
1993, the US government has spent tens of billions of dollars to reinforce the US-Mexico 
border to deter undocumented workers from crossing illegally into the United State.  Both 
the spending on border enforcement and the number of border patrol agents have more 





Instead of deterring illegal entry along the US-Mexico border, as the US government had 
intended, the intensification of border control led to more frequent use of coyotes. Among 
Oaxacan migrants, for instance, the percentage of coyote use has risen from 69 percent 
before 1995 to 80 percent between 2005 and 2007.
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According to the  data collected on migrants from Tlacuitapa in West -Central Mexico, 
coyote fees also rose proportionally with stricter enforcement. In 1990, border patrols 
clocked 2.5 million linewatch hours. At around the same time, the typical coyote fee was 
set at around US$1,000. By 2002, however, linewatch hours increased to 9 million and 
coyote fees more than doubled, to nearly US$ 2,500 per crossing.
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Beyond the increase in coyote fees is an additional, non-monetary cost — the decline in 
migrants‘  agency.  While  potential  migrants  still  make  the  fundamental  decision  of 
whether or not to migrate, a study by Fuentes, among others, suggest that migrants are 
increasingly leaving the logistics of border crossings up to smugglers.  Coyotes are taking 
their clients through more dangerous crossing routes — resulting in higher dependence 
on smugglers, greater hardships and greater risks while crossing.
129  
3. Making employers more accountable 
 
Efforts to control actions of intermediaries either through regulations or enforcement may 
not, in themselves, be sufficient.  Employers may have to assume a more active role in 
the recruitment phase and ensure that their recruiters follow ethical recruitment practices.  
As Bruce Goldstein argues, during the 19
th century, slavery-like labor and recruitment 
abuses of contractors and agents in the United States, Great Britain and Australia waned 
after governments put pressures on the companies that hire them.
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Indeed, businesses can be a crucial partner in influencing recruitment practices. F or 
instance, in August 2008, an Australian TV channel exposed the poor working and 
recruitment conditions faced by migrant workers in a Malaysian factory producing Nike 
products.    In  response  to  media  scrutiny,  Nike  asked  the  factory  to  reimburse  all  
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employment-related fees, including recruiting and worker permit fees, to the migrants. In 
the future, Nike also promised that any and all fees associated with employment will be 
paid by the factory.
131 Similarly, Gap developed a code of conduct for its contractors and 
recruiters.  Some  migrant  groups  have  acknowledged  that  Gap‗s  code  has  been 
particularly useful in influencing recruitment practices.
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A 2008 report prepared by Business for Social Responsibility, a professional organization 
with a global network of  more than 250 businesses, cited the following areas where 
companies can actively contribute to improving the recruitment system:
133 
  Adjust companies‘ codes of conduct to include specific protections for migrant 
workers. 
  Train  suppliers  on management issues  related to  migrant  workers and support 
their efforts to ensure fair treatment. 
  Include migrant-worker issues in auditing activities. 
  Tie purchasing decisions to ethical treatment of migrant workers.  
4. Cross-border Initiatives 
 
Given the cross-border nature of international migration, the regulatory and enforcement 
efforts  of  different  governments  will  be  fully  effective  only  if  both  host  and  source 
countries  are  equally  committed  to  introducing  and  enforcing  rules.
134  International 
migration is best addressed using transnational solutions.  
 
Bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) are potentially useful tools 
toward this end. For instance, an MOU between the Philippines government and three 
Canadian provinces signed in 2008 set parameters fo r recruitment, including a ban on 
charging placement fees to migrants.  China and the United Kingdom‘s Department of 
Health made roughly similar arrangements involving Chinese nurse migration.
135 
Dialogue and consultative processes at the regional level can  be useful as well. For 
example, through funding from the International Organization for Migration, several  
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countries of origin from South and Southeast Asia established a regional dialogue in 
2003,  known  today  as  the  ―Colombo  Process.‖  The  UAE  later  hosted  and  funded  a 
Ministerial  Consultation  between  the  Colombo  Process  countries  and  9  destination 
countries in the Middle East and East and South East Asia.  In 2008, the joint group 
issued the Abu Dhabi  Declaration, a set  of principles  which recognizes  the need  for 
―transparent, legal and humane recruitment practices.‖
136 The group also launched a pilot 
project  between  the  UAE,  Philippines  and  India  that  will  test  recruitment  and  pre-
deployment policies and procedures among the three countries.
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A  number  of  in ternational  treaties  and  instruments  address  concerns  over  human 
trafficking, smuggling and general recruitment practices, such as the Palermo Protocols 
already  noted  earlier.  Likewise,  two  ILO  instruments  on  migrant  workers  —  the 
Migration  for  Employment  (Revised)  Convention,  1949  (No.  97)  and  the  Migrant 
Workers  (Supplementary  Provisions)  Convention,  1975  (No.  143),  as  well  as  their 




Assessments of the impact of th ese international instruments on the ground are mixed. 
For example, while some have praised the protocol for criminalizing recruiters who are 
involved  in  trafficking  of  human  beings,  others  have  questioned  its  unintended 
consequences.  Given  the  blurred  dis tinction  between  migration,  smuggling  and 
trafficking, there are concerns that criminalizing migrants or the industries they work in
 
simply forces them "underground," making them more difficult
 to reach with appropriate 
services and increasing the likelihood
 of exploitation. The classification of recruitment to 
certain  kinds  of  activities  —  prostitution  or  child  labor,  for  example  —  as  always 
involving trafficking may  oversimplify or mischaracterize the realities of a particular 
situation. 
 
For instance, a survey of child migrants in Mali who had been returned from the
 Ivory 
Coast and Vietnamese sex workers in Cambodia, involving 1000 subjects, found that 
only four could be classified as having
 been deceived, exploited, or not paid at all for  
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their labor. They could well have been said to move out of desperation, but were not, in 
most cases, coerced by intermediaries. The study found that the migrants‘ movement 
across international borders often
 depended on assistance from intermediaries, who in 
many cases were family members.
 Especially in Mali, there is a longstanding tradition of 
using intermediaries
 to facilitate a range of social and economic activities, such
 as looking 
for employment, negotiating purchases, handling disputes,
 and even seeking a spouse. 
The research found that intermediaries
 could protect the migrants during their journey 
and help them
 search for work. In destination areas, they advocated for young
 people in 
cases of non-payment of salary or abrupt termination
 of employment. Migrants also relied 
on  intermediaries  to  negotiate
  with  corrupt  authorities  that  demanded  bribes  at 
international
  borders.  The  study  concluded  that  ―classifying  such  assistance  as 
"trafficking" simplifies
 a much deeper cultural reality.‖
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B. Beyond Control: Self-regulation  
 
Although perhaps necessary for curbing abusive recruitment practices, efforts focused on 
control alone, either by governments, employers or through international, regional and 
bilateral agreements may not be sufficient. Since industry associations have been formed 
in  many  countries,  some  point  to  intermediaries‘  potential  to  develop  and  enforce 
voluntary codes of conduct among themselves.  To counter their negative image in some 
quarters,  top  agencies  aim  to  promote  good  business  practice  through  developing 
mechanisms  of  self-regulation. 
 
In  developed  countries,  some  have  organized  themselves  into  national  industry 
associations  employing  industry  codes  of  practice  as  a  condition  for  membership.  In 
Canada, for instance, agencies are organized into an Association of Canadian Search, 
Employment and Staffing Services (ACSESS) to guarantee professional ethics, standards 
and best practices in the recruitment, employment and staffing services industry.
140 
 
Similarly in the Russian Federation, the International Association of Labor Migration 
(IALM) was founded in 2004 and includes over 70 private recruitment agencies from  
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Russia,  Tajikistan  and  Moldova.  IALM  aims  to  develop  ―civilized‖  forms  of  labor 
migration through ―advocacy, the organization of conferences and active participation in 
policy dialogue.‖ A Code of Business Ethics guides all IALM members‘ operation.
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In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Recruitment  and  Employment  Confederation  (REC), 
representing 8000 recruitment companies, has likewise developed a Code of Recruitment 
Practice  covering  all  member  agencies.  The  REC  code  requires  agencies  to  provide 
adequate information on terms of recruitment and employment so that migrants can make 
informed  decisions.  It  also  prohibits  members  from  charging  for  services  unless  the 
services were legal and payment was part of normal custom.  A standards team monitors 
the adherence to the code and issues quarterly reports on complaints and queries about 
agency conduct.
142  Currently, REC has four enforcement officers to random ly inspect 
REC members. 
 
One of the most recognized industry associations is the Belgian-based Confederation of 
Private  Employment  Agencies  (CIETT),  an  international  organization  composed  of 
representatives  of  national  industry  organizations,  as  well  as  large  multinational 
enterprises, which has developed its own Code of Practice. Currently, it is home to 40 
national  federations  of  private  employment  agencies  and  six  of  the  largest  staffing 
companies worldwide, including Manpower and Adecco. CIETT aims to seek greater 
recognition  of  the  contribution  of  agency  work  to  overall  employment  creation, 
integration in the labor market and economic growth.  The ILO recognized CIETT as the 
leader in establishing worldwide standards for its agency members in the recruitment 
industry. 
143 CIETT‘s code, among others, prohibits members from charging, directly or 
indirectly, any fees or costs to workers for job-finding services.
144 
 
Beyond enforcing a code, agency associations also raise standards in the industry by 
collecting information about high-risk agencies via regular screenings of their members 
and new membership applications, as well as by organizing training seminars.  Since 
recruitment is not a certified profession, business associations also disseminate know -





In  1997,  a  meeting  of  international  experts  organized  by  the  ILO  elaborated 
recommendations  to  encourage self-regulation  of agencies engaged in  recruitment  for 




   minimum standards for the professionalization of the services of private agencies, 
including specifications regarding minimum qualifications of their personnel and 
managers; 
  the  full  and  unambiguous  disclosure  of  all  charges  and  terms  of  business  to 
clients; 
  the principle that private agents must obtain from the employer before advertising 
positions  in  as  much  detail  as  possible,  all  information  pertaining  to  the  job, 
including  specific  functions  and  responsibilities,  wages,  salaries,  and  other 
benefits, working conditions, travel and accommodation arrangements; 
  the principle that private agents should not knowingly recruit workers for jobs 
involving undue hazards or risks or where they may be subjected to abuse or 
discriminatory treatment of any kind; 
   the principle that migrant workers are informed, as far as possible, in their mother 
tongue or in a language with which they are familiar, of the terms and conditions 
of employment; 
  refraining from bidding down wages of migrant workers; and 
  maintaining  a register of all migrants  recruited  or placed through them, to  be 
available for inspection by the competent authority, provided that information so 
obtained is limited to matters directly concerned with recruitment and that in all 
instances the privacy of workers and their families is respected. 
 
Some  observers  are  highly  skeptical  about  the  impact  of  self-regulation,  with  one 
industry analyst noting that it ―did not prevent abuses that damage the entire sector.‖
147 
Others see codes-of-conduct as limited instruments due to their voluntary nature, while 
some  see  problems  arising  from  the  recruitment  sector‘s  instability.  In  Australia,  for  
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instance, of the 3,000 registered agents, nearly half have less than three years experience 
and only 12 percent have existed for more than 10 years.
148   
Indeed, despite the existence of many recruitment agency associations in South and East 
Asia, none has emerged as a self-regulatory body similar to those found in the Western 
Hemisphere. Most have focused squarely  on ensuring that their government‘s policy on 
migration is friendly to the recruitment industry — an observation found in many major 
sending countries like the Philippines, Bangladesh
149 and Sri Lanka
150.  
The experience of the Philippine -based Association for  Professionalism in Overseas 
Employment (ASPROE) points to the difficulties of self-regulation. ASPROE is the only 
agent organization in the Philippines that bans members from charging placement and 
other fees to workers. Not surprisingly, the association remains very small — with only 8 
members out of the nearly 1,500 licensed agencies. As its founder and Chairman Rene 
Cristobal bluntly puts it in an interview: ―there are a million reasons why I can count our 
members using fingers of my two hands, and they will not paint a pretty picture of the 
Philippine recruiting industry.‖
151  
Despite these concerns, self-regulation has found a healthy following, especially among 
international organizations like the IOM, United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM) and World Health Organization (WHO).  In 2008, IOM sponsored a series of 
events to help intermediaries‘ associations in Asia to form confederations and build their 
own code of conducts.
152 UNIFEM‘s Bangkok office developed the Covenant of Ethical 
Conduct and Good Practices of Overseas Employment Service Providers in 2006, and 
since then has been working with intermediaries‘ organizations in the region to adopt the 
covenant.
153  Currently, the WHO is working to  develop a  code  of  conduct  for the 
international recruitment of health personnel.  A draft under current deliberation includes 
a ban on charging recruitment-related fees to migrants.
154 
Recently,  Academy  Health,  a  non -partisan,  scholarly  society  for  health  services 
researchers, policy analysts, and practitione rs, convened a task -force of over 30 high 
level  members  representing  hospitals,  trade  unions,  nurse  training  and  licensure 




Released in November 2008, the Voluntary Code of Ethical Conduct for the Recruitment 
of  Foreign-Educated  Nurses  to  the  United  States  includes  innovative  measures.  For 
instance, the code requires recruiters to secure written consent from the nurses before any 
sale or transfer of their contracts can take place. It also bans recruiters from charging 
recruitment-related fees to nurses when payment for the same services (e.g., fees solely 
for placement and/or recruitment of healthcare professionals) is already being provided 
by the employers.
156 
Aside from voluntary codes of practice, another self-regulation tool is rating or labeling. 
Major multinational companies have earned the ISO 9000 label of quality management 
by the International Standards Organization. Agencies use the label in their advertising 
and marketing campaigns as a guarantee of quality, since throughout the ISO 9000 




C. Cutting out “commercial” intermediaries 
 
Beyond a policy centered on control and self-regulation, another proposed solution is to 
simplify  the  recruitment  process  by  cutting  down  the  parties  to  bare  minimum.  The 
practice of outsourcing recruitment to brokers and sub-agents, as described earlier, carries 
far too many risks, and increases the costs to both workers and employers.  As more and 
more parties try to make profits on every deployment, the system of accountability breaks 
down.    
 
This can be addressed by banning the use of sub-agents or brokers, essentially reducing 
the layers of intermediaries — although this idea is difficult to apply in practice.
158 For 
instance,  in  July  2008,  Saudi  Arabia  introduced  a  new  contract  scheme  called  ―The 
Unified Labor Contract‖.  Under this scheme, foreign labor suppliers are required do 
business  directly  with  the  Saudi  National  Recruitment  Committee  (SANARCOM),  a 
private association of Saudi manpower offices. SANARCOM will act as a broker in the 
issuing  of  visas,  making  it  the  key  intermediary  in  connecting  foreign  workers  with 
employers in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government rationalizes this scheme as an attempt  
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to  curtail  the  role  of  multiple  recruitment  agencies  by  ceding  authority  to  one 
intermediary.
159 Recruitment agencies in migrant origin countries, particularly Indonesia 
and the Philippines, on the other hand, have voiced strong disagreement. They claim that, 
on the contrary, the scheme will only add another layer in the recruitment process.  It will 
bar  agencies  at  origin  from  contracting  directly  with  Saudi  employers.  Indeed,  its 
implementation, which was supposed to take effect in August 1, 2008, has been deferred 
as a result of formal protests from the Philippine and Indonesian governments.
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Another approach is to keep for -profit intermediaries out of the system altogether. For 
instance,  in  Malaysia,  both  NGOs  and  the  M alaysian  Employers‘  Federation  have 
advocated for a government-to-government system of recruitment to reduce costs, and, at 
the  same  time,  improve  transparency.
161  There have been a number of cases where 
governments act as intermediaries, particularly in the highly-skilled sector.  Sri Lanka‘s 
departments of Health and of Education have directly placed nurses in Malaysia and 
teachers in  the Maldives and Mauritius.
162 A government-managed twinning program 
between the United Kingdom and South Africa moves health  care professionals of both 
countries to work in the other country for up to six months.
163 In a teacher exchange 
program between local government agencies in the United States and the governments of 
Spain and Mexico, Mexican and Spanish education ministries  pre-screen applicants at 




International  and  non -governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  can  also  assume  the 
intermediary‘s role. For instance, since 2003, IOM's Guatemala office has coordinated 
with the Canadian NGO FERME to facilitate the temporary movement of Guatemalan 
agricultural workers to Quebec, Canada. IOM assists in selection, pre-departure health 
checks and the transfer of the workers from Guatemala to Canada, and monitors their 
return.  In  addition,  IOM  coordinates  banking  services  for  remittance  transfers  and  a 





Similarly, in Colombia, the Pan-American Development Foundation, with funding from 
the US Agency for International Development, works with the Colombian government, 
Colombian NGOs, and neighboring countries to help internally displaced persons move 
into new locations or return to their homes.
166 
 
Movements through these programs are, however,  small, raising questions about the 
approach‘s  feasibility  in  large-scale  deployments.  Indeed,  the  Philippines,  which 
currently  deploys  over  one  million  temporary  migrant  workers  annually,  initially 
envisioned complete government control of overseas recruitment. Public Employment 
Agencies were set up in 1974 to replace private agencies (which were at that time blamed 
for  widespread  cases  of  abuse)  through  a  four-year  plan.  However,  by  1977,  the 
government  completely  reversed  course  and  opted  for  regulation,  citing  limited 
government capacity. Currently, the government handles less than 1 percent of annual 
deployment, or just around 9,000 workers per year. 
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Clearly, governments, NGOs and international organizations with their current capacities 
can realistically facilitate movement among only a limited number of migrants. Many 
simply do not have the capacity and flexibility to respond more effectively to a dynamic 
global labor market. Still, their value should not be dismissed. Experiences and lessons 
learned from these non-profit intermediaries can offer valuable insights in improving the 
operations  of  their  much  larger,  profit -oriented  counterparts.  Indeed,  a  study  of 
intermediaries in the Silicon Valley and Milwaukee areas in the United States found that 
unlike  for-profit  intermediaries,  non -profit  intermediaries  provide  more  assistance, 
beyond placement. For example, 60 percent of people who worked with non -profit 
intermediaries received assistance in job -hunting skills compared to 33 percent among 
those who consulted commercial temporary-help firms.
168 
V.  Intermediation in a Condition of Scarcity: A Conceptual Framework 
 
With traffickers as clear exceptions, intermediaries exist and thrive because prospective 
migrants  find  their  services  worthwhile.    A  better  understanding  of  the  difference  
45 
 
between  the  provision  of  useful  services  which  are  valued  by  the  market  and  the 
exploitation of migrants who may be in a very weak bargaining position is critical to 
designing appropriate policy interventions.  
As Tim Elrick and Emilia Lewandowska noted in their study of Italy and Germany‘s 
domestic care industry, there is a ―fine line between an occasionally abusive treatment of 
migrants and the purposeful ‗deception or coercion [. . .] for the purpose of exploitation‘ 
something  regarded  as  trafficking  by  the  United  Nations.‖
169  Some  cases  cross  quite 
clearly into abuse or even outright slavery.  
 
A bright line between what the market will bear and exploitative charges or practices or 
between  exploitation  and  criminal  abuse  rarely  exists.  Central  to  this  ambiguity  is 
defining the appropriate price intermediaries can legitimately charge migrants. Clearly 
separating  legitimate  fees  for  a  service  that  expands  the  range  of  choices  open  to 
prospective  migrants  from  predatory  practices  that  arbitrage  the  difference  between 
wages in home and host countries to the migrant‘s detriment is difficult and open to 
debate.   
One  way  to  settle  this  debate  is  for  regulators  to  set  fees  that  basically  reflect 
intermediaries‘ cost of provision plus what may be considered as ―normal‖ or competitive 
profits.      From  this  prospective,  a  policy  that  bans  agencies  from  charging  fees  to 
migrants for services that are already paid for by the employer makes sense. Indeed, as 
already  indicated  earlier,  in  many  developed  countries,  temporary  work  agencies,  by 
custom, do not charge the workers placement fees.  
However,  in  cases  where  the  demand  for  jobs  is  extraordinarily  high  relative  to  the 
supply — such as one typically finds in international migration — or when there is high 
unemployment within internal markets, the concept of prohibiting fees may not easily 
apply in practice. As Manolo Abella argues, the ―fee is not determined by the financial 
value of the good procured but by demand itself… What the recruiter gets is not a fee for 
the recruiter service but a ―bribe‖ to the job he or she offers.‖
170 Indeed, migrants tapping 
highly competitive local and global labor markets are typically willing to pay more. A  
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general policy that bans placement fees or keeps them within the cost of provision may 
be sound conceptually but will be difficult to enforce on the ground.  
Even the ILO recognizes that there are cases where legal agencies may have to collect 
fees from migrants to make them competitive vis-à-vis their illegal counterparts who are 
making money through acceptance of bribes. Indeed, in these cases, the challenge is to 
identify  the  legitimate  ceiling  on  fees  that  balances  realities  on  the  ground  without 
disregarding concerns over fairness.
171 
What is the scarce good?  
One way to reach a middle ground is to recognize the nature of scarcity in the migrant 
labor  market.    Is  the  scarce  good  access  to  information,  access  to  jobs  or  the  jobs 
themselves?  
1. Access to information 
 
In  labor  markets  where  the  main  constraint  on  movement  is  migrants‘  access  to 
information, explicit regulation of fees may not be necessary, especially considering the 
costs associated with enforcement.  Indeed, in sectors with high demand for workers, 
such as the medical and health professionals, agencies do not typically charge placement 
fees to migrant workers; rather, they collect fees mainly from employers.  For instance, a 
survey  of  nurse  recruiters  in  the  United  States  found  that  a  substantial  majority  (82 
percent) do not charge nurses an up-front fee.
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In these cases, the deregulation of agencies maybe the best policy route, which limits the 
government‘s role to dissemination of information. As will be discussed in more detail 
later, governments, along with other stakeholders, should focus on distributing accurate 






2. Access to Jobs 
If the scarce good is access to jobs, and not just information about jobs, a more pro-active 
policy stance may be necessary. In this case, the intermediary is acting as the gatekeeper 
and is capable of using this position of market power to make migrant workers pay more. 
This  is  the  danger  in  an  arrangement  such  as  that  in  the  United  Kingdom  where 
negotiations of ‗block contracts‘, ‗preferred supplier lists‘ and ‗service-level agreements‘ 
in some sectors have been increasing since the 1990‘s. As of 2007, about 66 per cent of 
UK  organizations  have  ‗preferred  supplier‘  agency  lists  while  51  per  cent  have  a 
‗partnership  relationship‘  with  their  main  agency  supplier.  Within  the  UK  National 
Health Service, in particular, some trusts have signed ‗sole-supplier‘ or ‗master vendor‘ 
contracts that allow a single agency to provide all workers at a fixed volume discount.
173 
In cases where this danger is realized, the appropriate policy response would be to 
increase competition among intermediaries by relaxing entry rules and allowing new 
players to build their base.  
For instance, the United Kingdom implements a differential, or ―banding,‖ approach in 
charging licensing fees to gangmasters. In this policy, the license fee is proportionate to 
the expected size of the business. For instance, applicants with expected earnings of less 
than £1 million belong to the lowest band and pay only  £2,250 in entry fees, an amount  
that is significantly less than what is required from larger businesses.
174 If the government 
asked for a flat license fee instead, small businesses have to pay significantly more which 
will then create a financial barrier to e ntry. In addition, it would deter less -than-fully 
compliant agencies from coming forward for licensing.
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3. Jobs  
 
The most difficult of cases to regulate are instances where the scarce good is not access to 
information or access to jobs but the jobs themselves. As already mentioned, migrants in 
very competitive labor markets are generally willing to pay more simply because there 
are more people wanting to emigrate than there are (legal) places, and illegal entry is 
increasingly difficult for an individual to accomplish on his/her own. Especially evident  
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in international migration, migrants will pay high fees not because recruiters have market 
power but because of job rationing by countries of destination.    
 
Therefore,  in  these  cases,  increasing  competition  among  intermediaries  is  not  the 
solution. Although it maybe counterintuitive, regulation should aim to limit the players to 
a  qualified  few.  In  particular,  the  Philippine  experience  suggests  that  encouraging 
economies  of  scale  among  recruiters  would  be  a  better  option  because  it  serves  two 
purposes. For one, larger and more stable recruiters tend to be more efficient and have 
lower overhead. They profit from many migrants, not just a few and therefore can afford 
to lower their placement fees because their fixed costs are spread across a larger number 
of  clients.  Additionally,  a  smaller  number  of  larger  players  are  relatively  easier  to 
monitor — an important consideration for many developing country governments whose 
institutional capacity maybe severely constrained.  
  
Indeed,  the  Philippine  regulatory  system  was  created  primarily  to  deter  what  policy 
makers  then  characterized  as  cut-throat  competition  among  recruitment  agencies.  
Competition  to  a  certain  degree  is  necessary,  especially  in  private  sector  driven 
recruitment industries like that of the Philippines; however, too much competition can 
actually increase the likelihood of worker abuse.  As already mentioned earlier, in an 
overcrowded market, failing agencies do not necessarily leave the market and may prefer 
to  recoup  their  losses  by  exploiting  migrants.  In  these  cases,  instituting  strict  entry 
conditions to weed out potential violators makes good policy sense.  
 
Regulation of fees may also be justified when the scarce good is the jobs themselves in 
order  to  prevent  intermediaries  from  capturing  too  high  a  proportion  of  the  wage 
differential between origin and destination. Of course, the difficulty lies in determining 
what a legitimate cap is.  It is likely to lie somewhere between what a desperate migrant 
maybe willing to pay and a social and political consensus on what is fair value for the 




In Manolo Abella‘s analytical framework, migrants‘ perception of how much they are 
willing to pay would depend on the wage differential at home and destination. In cases, 
where the wage differential is high, one may expect that migrants are willing to pay 
higher  fees.
176  Many  governments  seemed  to  have  adopted  this  idea.  As  already 
mentioned, some governments set l imits on fees as a percentage of expected salary at 
destination while others chose to discriminate by skill level or job categories. In the 
Philippines, for instance, domestic helpers are exempted from paying placement fees 
because  the  wage  differential  in   this  sector  is,  in  absolute  terms,  relatively  small 
compared to other sectors, such as the medical field. 
 
However, beyond the wage differential, there are other factors that determine migrants‘ 
cost calculations, such as the expected length of stay, potential for upward mobility, or 
even non-economic concerns such as freedom of movement or religious concerns. These 
factors are difficult to quantify and are often unstable, especially in the long run. Still, 
taking wage differentials into account in policy prescriptions will provide a fairly good, if 
not perfect, baseline.  
This framework which centers on identifying the nature of scarcity in the migrant labor 
market has important policy implications especially in countries with parallel, dual labor 
markets — one for native workers where the scarce good is mainly access to information 
or access to jobs and another for migrants, where the scarcity lies in the jobs themselves, 
not  just  the  access  to  or  information  about  them.    National  regulations  that  do  not 
recognize and act upon these differences are bound to fail.  
For instance, as mentioned earlier, in almost all states in the Persian Gulf, a national ―no 
placement fee‖ policy exists. This policy, however, is operative only in the labor markets 
reserved  for  the  native  population,  not  in  the  labor  markets  for  temporary  migrant 
workers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, given the high demand for work in the region, 
agencies based in the Gulf still make money by ―selling‖ their access to employers and 
jobs to agencies at the origin. 
The same tension will be evident as traditional countries of permanent migration began 
accepting  more  and  more  temporary  migrant  workers.  For  instance,  three  Canadian  
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provinces signed a labor-export agreement with the Philippine government in 2008 that 
will send low and/or mid-skilled temporary workers to Canada. Since it is customary for 
Canadian  agencies  not  to  charge  fees  to  workers,  the  provinces  applied  the  same 
requirement to Philippine agencies sending workers to Canada. Given the huge demand 
for these limited temporary visas, it is doubtful that this requirement will be fully applied 
on the ground.  
VI. Beyond the Intermediaries 
 
Regardless  of  the  nature  of  scarcity  in  the  migrant  labor  market,  the  success  of  any 
chosen policy interventions to regulate intermediaries will still depend on introducing 
parallel  initiatives  that  would  create  a  conducive  recruitment  environment.  Indirect 
polices  aimed  at  empowering  migrants  and  improving  migration  policy  and 
administration will have direct, positive and lasting impact on intermediaries‘ operation. 
A. Empowering migrants 
 
As already mentioned, intermediaries‘ value rests on their ability to provide migrants 
with a wider range of choices than they could access without assistance. Typically, in this 
exchange, migrants‘ bargaining position is relatively low, which often leads to fraud and 
abuse.  Empowering migrants and reducing this asymmetry can be achieved in four ways:  
1. Information Dissemination 
Governments,  along  with  other  stakeholders,  should  focus  on  distributing  accurate 
information so that migrants can make informed decisions. Prospective migrants need to 
be knowledgeable about their rights at home and abroad; safe recruitment, travel and 
employment procedures; risks associated with unauthorized movement; available options 
for legal migration; labor and migration regulations at origin and destination; and what 
constitutes  illegal  recruitment.
177  Allowing  the  intermediaries  to  monopolize 
dissemination of this type of information is a recipe for migrant abuse.   
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Sharing of critical information can be done through information campaigns in the media 
and more directly, through training and seminars. For instance, the Philippines requires 
mandatory  pre-departure  orientation  seminars  (PDOS)  to  help  build  skill  sets  and 
familiarize  would-be  migrants  with  the  culture  and  practices  of  their  host  countries. 
Specific  modules  are  customized  for  household  workers,  performing  artists  and 
entertainers,  nurses,  and  seafarers,  as  well  as  for  workers  migrating  to  certain 
countries/regions, such as Hong Kong, Libya, the Middle East, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
In  conducting  these  seminars,  the  government  partners  with  members  of  the  private 
sector and civil society (e.g., workers‘ groups and nongovernmental organizations).
178   
Such trainings and seminars, however, are difficult to implement. Reviews of PDOS are 
mixed. A 2005 survey conducted by the Philippine -based Scalabrini Migration Center 
found  that  84  percent  of  respondents  considered  PDOS  ―useful‖  or  ―very  useful,‖ 
particularly for first timers. However, the survey revealed the need for more country-
specific  information  and  smaller  group  discussions.
179  Some  migrant  groups  also 
complained that PDOS are very short courses conducted late into the migration pro cess, 
typically just days before departure.  
In Indonesia, where roughly similar information seminars also take place, critics have 
pointed  out  that  the  training  sessions  are  often  routine  and  ineffective,  and  are 
predominantly undertaken by recruiting com panies in the major cities  —  especially 
Jakarta.  Further, not all workers receive training in all areas relevant to their work.
180 
Destination countries can help in this area.  For instance, the European Union recently 
inaugurated a European Employment Agen cy in Mali as an  experimental portal to 
educate potential Malian migrants about the opportunities and risks of work abroad.
181 
Although mainly targeted at stopping the flow of illegal migrants into Europe, such 
centers can assist origin countries with their information dissemination efforts.  
Information  dissemination  should  also  be  extended  not  only  at  origin  but  also  at 
destination. For instance, interviews of nurse recruiters and employers in the United 
States point to the value of developing brochure for  nurses that specify their rights, 
obligations, and areas of caution. These brochures could be distributed by the U.S.  
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Department of State when nurses apply for visas. Other entities, such as trade unions, the 
National  Council  of  State  Boards  of  Nursing,  and  the  Commission  on  Graduates  of 
Foreign Nursing schools, could also distribute the brochure at destination and within the 
United States.
182 
Likewise,  in  Hong  Kong,  booklets  on  migrant  workers‘  rights  and  obligations  are 
distributed upon arrival at the airport. The guides are translated into various languages of 
dominant migrant groups.  
2. Welfare Support at Origin and Destination 
Limited access to welfare support in cases of recruitment-related abuse also decreases 
migrants‘ leverage against intermediaries.  There are three critical areas where migrants 
are most in need of support.  
First, many governments with licensing systems face difficulties in controlling illegal 
recruitment. Few victims come forward and, of those who do, many do not pursue their 
case  completely.  Recognizing  this  problem,  the  Philippine  government  started  an 
incentive program to encourage victims and witnesses of syndicated or large-scale illegal 
recruitment to participate in prosecuting such cases. Under the new ruling, victims and 
witnesses who work with the government are entitled to the following:
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  free legal assistance 
  financial  assistance,  including  payment  of  docket  fees,  subsistence  and 
transportation allowance, and other funding depending on availability 
  welfare  assistance,  such  as  help  in  finding  local  employment  or  overseas 
employment  
  free skills training 
 
At this early stage, the incentive program‘s impact is difficult to gauge. This renewed 
focus on providing financial and welfare assistance, however, is clearly a step in the right 
direction.   
Second, since potential migrants‘ own liquidity constraints force many to take out loans, 
often at exorbitant rates, it is also critical to improve migrants‘ access to fair credit.  As  
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already noted, migrants can easily find themselves in an overborrowed situation where 
their inability to service accumulated debt has severe effects on their wellbeing. In many 
cases, this is due to lenders‘ predatory behavior, in which they deliberately exploit the 
gullibility, ignorance or desperation of the borrowers to trap them in spiraling charges.  
 
Migrants  need  to  be  protected  against  abusive,  deceptive,  extortionate,  or  predatory 
behavior, but crafting policy to this effect is difficult. Protecting the vulnerable from 
unwise borrowing and dealing with the overborrowed poor have long been considered 
appropriate  matters  for  public  policy;  however,  as  yet  no  generally  agreed  policy 
approach has emerged, even in the advanced economies.  
 
One traditional approach, a ceiling on interest rates (usury laws), is still widely used, 
although it is increasingly considered rather ineffective as a measure, not least because 
opaque cost structures can result in total costs of credit greatly exceeding stated interest 
rates. Using what is known as ―behavioral pricing,‖ unscrupulous lenders advertise low 
interest rates knowing that they will attract naïve and disorganized borrowers who do not 
realize that their predictable behavior is sure to result in a very high overall cost of credit 
when penalties for late payments and other charges are factored in.
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 At the same time, to the extent that regulators can detect and limit these extra charges, 
low ceilings on interest rates are clearly counterproductive if they exclude many low -
income households that could be creditworthy even at the high rates needed by lenders to 
cover the costs of processing the borrowings. As a result, although most advanced 
countries still have usury ceilings, these have been relaxed or qualified by exemptions.
185 
Constraints on interest ceilings d o exist in numerous developing countries, and it is 
widely accepted that they inhibit the expansion of credit by formal and semiformal 
intermediaries.  For  example,  for  some  Muslims,  conformity  with  the  Sharia  law 




A more proactive approach would be to provide subsidized loans to migrant workers. To  
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prevent illegal recruiters and loan sharks from preying on overseas workers and their 
families, the Philippine government extends the following loans:
187   
 
  Predeparture loans (PDL) are offered to help defray the cost of predeparture 
requirements,  including  medical  examinations,  subsistence  allowance, 
clothing, and pocket money.  
  Family assistance loans (FAL) are for emergency purposes or family needs. 
The maximum loan amount is set at 40,000 pesos (US$869), payable in six 
months to a year and with a 9 percent annual interest deducted in advance. 
This benefit is limited to members who have at least six months remaining in 
their employment contract. 
 
One recurring problem with these loan programs has been low repayment rates. PDL and 
FAL loans have a repayment rate of 29 percent. Indeed, only 137 PDLs and 543 FALs 
were  approved in  2006 before the Philippine government  suspended lending  pending 
further evaluation.
188 Clearly, more innovative subsidy-based financing mechanisms can 
and should be devised, preferably with the cooperation of the private sector.  
 
Third,  the  role  of  foreign  missions  at  destinations  should  be  also   redefined.  The 
consulates remain the most important interlocutors for migrants, and through them some 
countries, such as Mexico and the Philippines, provide critical safety nets. Consulates can 
assume a wide range of roles that are complementary to policies described in the previous 
section. For instance, within a regulatory system, they can verify employment contracts 
and other documents, provide translation services, vouch for particular agents and hear 
and preside over complaints against recruiters as well as employers.  
3. Links with trade unions  
 
Another  way  of  empowering  migrants  is  to  facilitate  the  efforts  of  trade  unions  to 
organize them. Initially wary of advocating in behalf of migrants, an increasing number  
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of trade unions now are working towards equal recognition of labor rights, regardless of 
migration status.  
 
Unions in the United States reversed their anti-immigration stance starting in the late 
1990s. Vernon Briggs attributes this to the rapid increase in the proportion of immigrants 
in the U.S. workforce. Unions do not want immigrants to be anti-union because it will 
complicate  efforts  to  organize  workers.  They  also  understand  that  restrictions  on 
migration encourage illegal entry, and that workers who lack legal status are vulnerable 
to sub-standard wages and working conditions which undercut all workers.
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US  government  statistics  suggest  the  number  of  immigrants  belonging  to  unions 
increased 30 percent between 1996 and 2006, while the number of native -born union 
members declined by 9 percent.  Both populations saw decreases in the proportions of 
unionized workers, but the proportion of union members who are immigrants increased 
from 9 to 12 percent.
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Since trade unions are represented in tripartite commissions in a number of countries, 
they  can  considerably  influence  the  operations  of  intermediaries.  Trade  unions‘ 
international networks in sending and receiving countries can also share and exchange 
information on recruitment and placement of migrant workers. They can particularly use 
these international networks and their influence to draw attention to abusive behavior on 
the part of recruitment agencies and to the needs of victims of illegal recruitment and 
trafficking,  who  are  mostly  women  and  children.  Trade  unions  can  also  negotiate 
internationally  recognized  employment  contracts  that  could  be  signed  by  employers, 
recruitment agencies and migrants.
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For instance, the British Transport and General Workers Unions has campaigned for a 
system  of  licenses  for  UK  sub -contractors  that  hire  m igrant  workers.  These 
―gangmasters‖ employ about 100,000 workers, many unauthorized migrants. The union 
called  for  the  introduction  of  a  licensing  system  and  a  gangmaster  register,  which 
inspectors could then consult. These licenses would be valid for a limited period of time  
56 
 
and would be renewable as long as the gangmaster has not breached any obligations.  In 




4. Grant core rights  
 
Finally, an important component of empowering migrants is the granting, at the very 
least, of equal treatment and basic rights. Without access to a core set of rights, migrants 
—especially those with undocumented status -- are vulnerable to exploitation.  As Mary 
Cunneen argues, particularly in relation to migrant workers, ―policies that seek to control 
intermediaries‘ operation or to provide assistance to trafficked victims will ultimately be 




It is not a coincidence that many cases of recruitment-related abuse occur in specific 
sectors and countries that afford very limited protection to migrants. Most countries with 
a  huge  proportion  of  temporary  migrant  workers  exclude  certain  groups  of  migrant 
workers from the protections of their labor laws, including Bahrain, Singapore, Lebanon, 
and Kuwait. For instance, in an ILO study of national laws in 65 countries, only 19 have 
specific laws or regulations dealing with domestic work.
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Some countries do not honor contracts signed in the country of origin or at the migrant‘s 
embassy. In Lebanon, this practice has led to side contracts that the recruiting agencies, 
employers,  and  workers  sign.  These  contracts  usually  stipulate  salaries  below  the 
minimum wage.
195 Similarly in Qatar, contracts that skilled and unskilled workers sign in 
their home countries are not honored. The employers require workers to sign a new 
contract, which may specify a different position, wage, and entitlement. As in other Arab 






In the United States, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employers of farm workers are 
only required to pay the minimum wage if they have more than seven employees. Farm 
workers are also not entitled to overtime pay. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act of 1983 also exclude them from claiming rights to join unions and 
bargain collectively, one of the entitlements highly recommended by the ILO.
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Indeed, although the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation generally states 
that migrant workers should have the same labor protections as nationals in the country 
where they are working, exceptions are common. Some pro tections and benefits are not 
necessarily afforded to migrant workers.  For example, certain Canadian provinces do not 
provide  migrants  with  health  insurance,  and  certain  migrants  do  not  meet  the 
requirements for unemployment benefits in the United States.
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Minimum Rights  
 
The ILO came up with recommendations on the set of minimum rights that should be 
afforded to migrant workers. They include:
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  freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
  adequate protection in terms of minimum wages; working time and other working 
conditions; 
  statutory social security benefits;  
  access to training; occupational safety and health;  
  compensation in cases of occupational accidents and diseases and insolvency and 
protection of workers‘ claims;  
  maternity protection and benefits. 
 
The ILO also requires agencies that deploy workers to a third party (referred to as ―user 








Another promising area pertains to visa portability, which allows migrants workers to 
change  employers  without  losing  their  work  authorization.  Portability  of  visas  gives 
workers leverage in what is otherwise an unequal employment relationship ripe for abuse 
and exploitation. Though the United States does not have this across the board, current 
regulations, under certain conditions, allow portability for H-1B visa holders who are 
mostly professionals with at least a university education.
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Doris  Meissner,  former  head  of  the  US  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service 
recommends that this portability should be extended to all temporary workers in order to 
prevent labor exploitation. Meissner argues that ―one way to overcome this problem is to 
allow portability of the visa — perhaps after an initial work period — as a way to try to 
level the playing field. In this way, if the worker can take the opportunity of being in the 
United States  and move the visa to a different,  comparable job,  it gives  him needed 
negotiating leverage in the employment relationship.‖
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Some  countries  seem  to  be  adopting  this  route.    For  instance,  the  UAE  Cabinet  has 
passed  reforms  in  2007  to  combat  abusive  labor  practices,  one  of  which  is  to  allow 
workers in all labor sectors to transfer employer sponsorship.
203 The United States does 
offer programs with complete portability but o n a much smaller scale than the H -1B. 
Foreign students, for instance, can find jobs as an adjunct to their studies without any 
employer  restriction.  Under  the  North  America  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA), 
Canadian and Mexican professionals with proof of qualifications and a job offer can also 
enter  the  United  States  and  are  subsequently  permitted  to  change  employers.
204 
 
Of course, the composition of a set of core rights will and should be a matter of intense 
debate, but certainly should not be out of the question.  Protecting migrants from abusive 
recruitment practices requires, at the minimum, a healthy and honest discussion of the 




Some  Council  of  Europe  member  states  have  already  adopted  rules  ensuring  that 
temporary  migrant  workers  receive  the  same  treatment  in  terms  of  wages,  working 
conditions  and  social  rights  as  the  local  labor  forces  in  their  respective  countries. 
Moreover, Article 19 of the revised European Social Charter also provides guidelines for 
some of the basic standards with respect to the right of migrant workers and their families 




B. Migration policy and administration 
 
Fully addressing the challenges impose by intermediaries also requires an understanding 
of the wider context surrounding migration policy and administration.  As stated earlier, 
intermediaries  exist  because  they  fill  gaps  between  employers  or  sponsors  and  the 
prospective migrants. Although the nature and extent of these gaps are shaped by myriad 
factors, migration policy and administration are foremost among them. The problem in 
this area is two-fold.  
 
First, in many destination countries, there is a policy mismatch between restrictive entry 
and high labor demand, especially for the low and mid-skilled. This mismatch increases 
the likelihood that intermediation itself is either unnecessarily expensive or, at the limit, 
exploitative. As research has shown, where legal migration is limited and demand for 
migrant labor is high, prospective migrants are willing to pay higher prices and take the 
irregular  route,  where  they  often  must  depend  on  illegal  recruitment  agencies  and 
smugglers, and, in the worst of cases, may fall into the hands of traffickers.    
 
Second,  excessive  and  complex  regulations  have  created  additional  rents  for 
intermediaries and other actors, such as corrupt officials and the like.  In the United 
States,  for  instance,  the  labor  certification  process  for  foreign  workers  remains  a 
complicated procedure that is often expensive and time-consuming.  Although complex 
processes  exist  for  temporary  and  permanent  labor  certification,  workers  seeking  
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temporary employment, especially those that are unskilled, are particularly vulnerable to 
the backlogs and fees associated with the certification process.
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Simplifying entry requirements would address this problem. So would housing concerned 
ministries and offices in one convenient location. For instance, in o rder to expedite the 
processing of foreign worker applications, Malaysia created a One-Stop Centre located in 
the Immigration  Department.  Officials  who work  full -time in  the  One -Stop  Centre 
include relevant ministries such as the:
207 
 
  Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
  Ministry of Human Resources 
  Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry 
  Ministry of Plantation Industry and Commodity 
  Construction Industry Development Board 
 
Among origin countries, the Philippines has also streamlined the deployment process by 
creating one agency that handles all the required steps.  
VII.  Conclusion 
 
In an increasingly globalized world where migration routes — both legal and illegal — 
are in constant flux and migration flows are diversifying, intermediaries will continue to 
play an important role as providers of information and logistics support, at origin, in 
transit and at destination. Their services are critical to many prospective migrants whose 
range of choices is very limited. However their value is, in many cases, overshadowed by 
the costs they impose on migrants, from charging exorbitant fees to outright abuse of 
basic human rights.  
Depending on the role they choose to take, intermediaries can, in the best of cases, be 
agents of human development. By expanding migrants‘ capabilities and their range of 
choices, intermediaries can enable migrants to realize their intentions to move and lead  
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lives that they value.  In the worst of cases, however, intermediaries are detrimental to 
human development.  
Policy prescriptions discussed in the two previous sections suggest room for many types 
of  interventions.    Governments,  along  with  other  stakeholders,  can  control 
intermediaries‘ operations via government regulations, stricter enforcement of existing 
rules, border control efforts and other employer-led and cross-border initiatives.  Some 
also see potential in supporting intermediaries‘ effort to self-regulate, or in keeping them 
out of the system altogether by promoting movements mediated by governments, NGOs 
and international organizations. 
In weighing these policy options, it is important to recognize that there is rarely a bright 
line  separating  what  the  market  will  bear  from  exploitative  charges  or  practices,  or 
exploitation from criminal abuse. This can be addressed by adopting a framework that 
recognizes the importance of first identifying the nature of scarcity and recognizing how 
migrants  can  best  overcome  the  constraints  of  scarce  information,  access  and 
employment opportunities.   
The success of these policy interventions will depend on launching a parallel initiative 
that empowers migrants. To this end, governments and other interested stakeholders can 
choose to disseminate information, provide welfare support at origin and destination, link 
migrants  to  trade unions  and other organized advocates  and protect  the basic human 
rights of migrants regardless of their status.  Fully addressing the challenges imposed by 
intermediaries also requires an understanding of the wider context surrounding migration 
policy  and  administration,  particularly  concerns  over  unrealistic  visa  restrictions  and 
complex administrative procedures.  
 
Ultimately,  however,  the  goal  of  policy  interventions  should  not  focus  only  on 
minimizing the costs that migrants incur by using intermediaries without any regard to 
how  the  very  same  policies  might  impact  migrant‘s  efforts  to  better  their  lives.  The 
mantra  —  first,  do  no  harm  —  applies  with  as  much  resonance  to  the  recruitment 




Given  the  difficulty  in  protecting  migrants  from  exploitation,  especially  those  in 
vulnerable  and  low-value  occupations,  some  governments  have  initiated  policies  and 
regulations that essentially close or limit legal  channels. A good case in point is the 
Philippines. In 2007, for the first time in nearly 20 years of active labor export, men 
comprised the majority of new hires.  A few years earlier, the Philippines introduced new 
requirements that make it harder for workers to emigrate as entertainers and domestic 
helpers, sectors dominated by women. Interestingly, the Philippines considered this as 
one of its three greatest accomplishments for the year because it signify the governments‘ 
success in shifting legal deployment away from low-skilled/vulnerable occupations — 
the  very  sector  that  disproportionately  suffer  from  intermediaries‘  abusive  and 
exploitative practices. 
 
The irony in this case is hard not to miss: some policies that run under the guise of 
protecting migrants from unscrupulous intermediaries also run the risk of impinging on 
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Registration and 
licensing 
Agencies  must 
obtain  a  license 
from  the 
industrial 
commission  if 
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employment 
services  for 
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overseas 
employment  are 
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of  Labor  and 
Social Security. 
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allowed  to  open, 
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agencies  without 
a relevant license 
are  prohibited 
from  operating 
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by  the  Minister 
of  Labor  and 
Social Insurance. 
Agencies  are 
required  to 
provide  advance 
registration  and 
must  include  the 
legal 
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the  business,  the 
name  of  the 
operators, 
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license fees  from US$100 for 
an  agency  with 
fewer  than  three 
placement 
counselors  to 
US$300 for eight 
or  more 
counselors. 
Farm  labour 
Contractors: 
C$150 
Charges  to 
workers 
        Fees  can  only  to 
be  charged  for 
obtaining 
employment 
directly  for  the 
applicant  within 
a  time  period 
upon  which  both 
parties  agreed.  
Fees  must  be  in 
accordance  with 
schedule  on  file 
with  the 
Agencies  are 
prohibited  from 
charging 
employee  for 
services. 




authority  and 
they  cannot 
exceed  10 
percent of yearly 
salary. Worker is 
entitled  to  a 
refund  of  fees  if 
the  placement 
lasted  for  less 
than 10 months.   
Financial 
capacities: 
deposit  or 
minimum 
capital 
Application for a 
license  requires 
minimum  cash 
deposit  of 
US$1,000  or 
surety  bond  in 
the  amount 
determined  by 
the  commission, 
not  to  exceed 
Farm  labour 
contractors  have 
to post a security 
equal  to  the 
amount  obtained 
by  multiplying 
the  minimum 
hourly  wage  by 
80,  and 
multiplying  the 
Agencies  must 
have  a  reserve 
fund  of  500,000 
Yuan. 
Each person must 
file,  with  his 
application  for  a 
license, a bond to 
the  state  in  the 
penal  sum  of 
US$7,500,  with 
surety  approved 
by  the 
commissioner. 
   Agencies  must 
maintain  a 
minimum  capital 
of  8  percent  of 
revenue  and 
sufficient  to 
cover  employee 
compensation for 
injury.    The 
amount  must  be  
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US$5,000,  to  be 
maintained  at  all 
times. 
result  by  the 
number  of 
employees 
specified  in  the 
license  with 
multiplier 
reduced to 60, 40 
and 20 after 1, 2 




certified  by  an 
auditor  and 
revised yearly. 




an  agency  must 




employment  and 
labor  laws  and 
regulations.  
Agencies  must 
satisfy  the 
director  that 
agency  will 
operate  "in  the 
best  interests  of 
employers  and 
persons  seeking 
employment." 
Agencies  must 
meet  the 
conditions for the 
establishment  of 
business 
corporations; 
have sound work 
systems,  staff 
rules,  and  full-
 The 
commissioner 
may  cancel  or 
suspend  the 
license  of  any 
person  when  it 
appears  to  his 
satisfaction, upon 
hearing, that such 
Agencies must be 
operated  by  a 
citizen  (or  for  a 
corporation,  a 
majority  of 
partners  or 
shareholders who 
are  citizens) 
possessing 
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time  staff 
members  with 
the  professional 
qualification  for 
law,  foreign 
language  or 
accounting.  





verification  of 
capital  and 
reserve  fund, 
articles  of 
association  and 
agency  rules, 
feasibility  report 
and  certification 
of business to the 
Ministry  of 
person  has  been 
convicted  in  a 
state  or  federal 
court  of  an 
offense  which, 
under the laws of 
the  state,  is  a 





and who have no 
criminal record.  
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Labor and Social 
Security. 
Validity  of 
license  and  re-
application 
Each  license  is 
valid for one year 
and  may  be 
renewed annually 
for  a  like  period 
of  time. 
Licensees  are 
entitled  to  45 
days'  prior 
written  notice  of 
license 
expiration. 
 A  corporation 
that is licensed as 
a  farm  labor 
contractor  must 
apply  for  a  new 
license  within  7 
days  after  any 
change  in  its 
directors  or 
officers. 
   Licenses must be 
renewed 
annually. 
     
Scope  and 
transferability 
of license 
   License  is  valid 
for one year after 
the date on which 
it was issued, and 
is  not 
transferable  or 
   The  legislation 
does not apply to 
nonprofits, 
private  hospitals, 
religious  or 
charitable 
institutions,  nor 




The director may 
issue  a  3-year 
license  if  the 
contractor  
renews  its 
irrevocable  letter 
of credit for each 
year of the term, 
and has not had a 
license  cancelled 
by the director. 
 
to  organizations 
dedicated  solely 




other  business 
regulation  or 
tax authorities 




agents to enforce 
laws. 
     Records  on 
employers  and 
employees  must 
be  available  to 
persons described 
therein and to the 
Labor 




Agreement  to 
comply  with 
labor  and  equal 
opportunity 
laws 
        Agencies  must 
demonstrate  to 
the  Labor 
Commissioner 
knowledge  of  all 
applicable  labor 
laws  and 
regulations. 
     
Restrictions  on 
operations 
Agencies  cannot 
split  fees  or 
compensation for 
its  services  with 
employers. 
   Agencies  cannot 
establish 
branches  without 
going through the 
same  procedures 
of  registration.  
Agencies  cannot 
organize  Chinese 
citizens  to  break 
Chinese law.  
Applicants 
cannot be sent to 
a  location  where 
a strike is taking 
place  without 
prior  written 
notice,  nor  can 
they be sent to ―a 
place  of  bad 
repute," or places 
kept  for 
"immoral 
Agencies  are 






where  workers 
are  on  strike, 
discouraging 
applications  to 
particular 







records  is 
prohibited.  
Applicants  are 
responsible  for 
payment  of  fees, 
which  must  be 
included  in 
advertisements. 
employers,  or 
recruiting 
minors.  
Sanctions  A  classification 
A  person,  firm, 
association  or 
corporation  who 
acts  as  an 
employment 
agent  without  a 
license  is  guilty 
of  a  class  6 
Licenses  can  be 
cancelled  or 
suspended  for 
falsifying  an 
application, 
operating 
"contrary  to  the 
best  interests  of 
employers  and 
   Agencies  must 
pay for losses or 
damages  to  any 
person  resulting 
from  failure  to 
comply  with  the 
legislation. 
Violators are also 
subject to fines of 
Violations  are 
subject  to 
maximum 
imprisonment  of 
12 months and/or 
fine  of 
CY£1,000. 
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felony."   persons  seeking 
employment," 
failing  to  inform 
employer  of 
requirement  to 
register  domestic 
workers.  




license are guilty 





Table 2: Legal Requirements for Establishing and Operating Recruitment and Placement Agencies in Various Countries 
 (cont’d.) 




migrant  worker 
recruiters  are 
required  to 
obtain  a  license 
Licensing  is 
required  for  any 
person intending 
to  conduct  the 
business  of  an 
   Must  register  in 
advance  of 
operations  to 
receive  a  "proof 
of  registration." 
Agencies  must 
submit 
application for a 




from  the 
specified 
authority  from 
both  the  home 





should  include 
domicile  of  the 
business.  
Registration  or 
license fees 
Certificate  of 
registration  fees 
range  from  Rs. 
60  for  agencies 
employing  5-20 
migrants  to  Rs. 
1,500  for 
agencies 
employing  over 
400  migrants.  
License  fees 
range  from  Rs. 
15 for between 5 
and  20 
employees to Rs. 
400 for over 400 
     Yes, 
unspecified. 
Every  licensee 
must  pay  such 
license  fee  as 





Charges  to 
workers 
   Licensing  fees 
must  correspond 
to  a  scale 
approved  by  the 
Minister  for 
Labor, and must 
not  be  charged 
based  only  on 
agreement  to 
seek 
employment  or 
employees. 
Agencies  cannot 
charge 
prospective 
workers any fees 
for placement. 
    
Financial 
capacities: 
deposit  or 
minimum 
capital 
      Agencies  are 
required  to 
maintain 
100,000  dirham 
in  capital  and  a 
security  deposit 
at  the  Caisse  de 
Depot  et  de 
   The 
Commissioner 
shall  consider 
the  application 
and may grant a 
license  with  or 
without 
conditions  or  
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Gestion  valued 
at  50  times  the 
minimum wage. 
refuse to grant a 
license. 
Personal  and 
professional 
qualifications 
   The Minister for 
Labor  grants 
licenses upon an 
agency's 
demonstration of 
conforming  to 
standards  of 
accommodation, 
suitability, 
fitness,  and  no 
violations  of the 
Act  within  the 
past 5 years. 
Licenses  cannot 
be  granted  to 
individuals 
convicted  of 
"attacks  on 
human honor" or 
having  served 
more  than  3 
months  in 
prison. 
All  private 
employment 
agencies  must 
include  natural 
persons.  
 Minimum  25 
years old 
Validity  of 
license  and  re-
application 
Individual 
licenses  specify 
a time period of 
validity, fees and 
conditions  of 
Licenses  can  be 
revoked  for 
giving  false 
information  or 
failing to comply 
Government 
authorities  must 
be  notified  of 
any  change  to 
The  "proof  of 
registration"  is 
valid for 2 years; 
must  request 
renewal  30 days 
A  license 
continues  in 
force  for  one 
year  from  the 





licenses are valid 
for one year.  
with  standards 
and 
requirements. 
operations.  before 
expiration.  
the license. 
Scope  and 
transferability 
of license 
   The  regulation 
does not apply to 
Minister  of 
State,  the  Civil 
Service 
Commission, nor 
the  Local 
Appointments 
Commission. 
Employers  are 
required  to 
provide  lodging, 
food,  medical 
care  and 




for  a  maximum 
of 6 months. 
Must  notify  the 
registrar  of  any 
change  of 
domicile  within 
5  days  of  the 




other  business 
regulation  or 
tax authorities 
Employers  and 
agencies  are 
required  to 
cooperate  with 
inspectors 
appointed by the 




provided  to  the 
National 
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Agreement  to 
comply  with 
labor and equal 
opportunity 
laws 
Contractors  are 
responsible  for 
payment  of 
wages  within 
prescribed  time 
frame. 
   Discrimination 
based  on  union 
activity,  race, 
color,  sex, 
religion, political 
opinion, 
ancestry,  class, 
or  other 
characteristics 
that  inhibits 
equality  of 
chances in terms 
of  employment 




abroad  must 
Must  provide 
equal 
opportunities  to 
all  employment 
candidates; 
discrimination  is 
explicitly 
prohibited. 
"Very  serious" 
sanctions for for-
profit  placement 
of  individuals 
without 
registration,  or 
minors,  or  the 
advertisement  or 





comply  with 




Restrictions  on 
operations 
     Agencies  are 
required  to 
provide  reports 
each semester to 
the  National 
Employment 
Service.  These 
reports  should 
include  services 
provided  and 
employers  and 
workers  served. 
Special 
provisions  apply 
to  "artistic" 
workers. 
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Sanctions  Licenses  can  be 
revoked  for 
―misrepresentati
on  or 
suppression  of 
any  material 
fact.‖    License 
holders have the 
right to appeal. 
The  Protection 
of  Employees 
(Fixed-Term 
Work)  Act  of 
2003  amended 
the  Employment 
Agency  Act  to 
make  offenders 
liable for fine up 
to  €2000  and 
further fine up to 
€1000 a day. 
Infractions of the 
law pertaining to 
the  employment 
of  Moroccans 
abroad  are 
punishable  by  a 
fine  of  2,000  to 
5,000 dirham. 
Failure  to 
register  or 
otherwise 
comply with  the 
law  subject  to  a 




can  revoke 
licenses  at  any 
time  for  any 
reason.    Making 
false  statements, 
overcharging  or 
discouraging  an 
employer  from 
hiring  someone 
outside  the 
agency  subject 
to  a  fine  up  to 
S$2,000 
(S$5,000  for 
repeat  offense) 
and/or  to 
imprisonment up 
to  6  months. 
Knowingly 




corruption"  of  a 
girl  or  woman 
subject to a fine 
up  to  S$5,000 
and/or 
imprisonment up 





TABLE N. TITLE (cont’d.) 




Sources: Arizona, Arizona Revised Statutes Title 23 
Labor,  Chapter  3,  accessible  at 
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.a
sp?Title=23;  Canada,  Employment  Standards  Act 
Employment  Standards  Regulation  [includes 
amendments  up  to  B.C.  Reg.  270/2008,  2008, 






6_95.xml; China, Provisions on the Administration of 
Intermediary  Activities  for  Overseas  Employment, 







agencies  must 
apply  for 
registration  to 
the  Director-
General  of 
Labor. 
Agencies  must 





providing  labor 
to  agriculture, 
horticulture  and 
shellfish 
industries  must 
register  and  be 
granted a license 




Registration  or 
license fees 
   Range  of 
registration fees: 
700  to  1500 
Swiss  francs 
depending  on 
Fee  is  based  on 
expected  annual 
income.  For 




workload  of 
authorities 
£1m=£2,250; 
£1m  - 
£5m=£4,050 
vities%20for%20Overseas%20Employment; 
Connecticut,  Chapter  564  Private  Employment  and 
Information  Agencies,  1995,  accessible  at 
http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/wgwkstnd/pa-
statutes.htm#31-130;  Cyprus,  The  Private 
Employment  Agencies  Law,  No.  8(1)/97,  1997, 
accessible  at 
http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/dl/dl.nsf/All/7B7556F1F
CD4B535C2256DB1002B2165/$file/Private%20Empl
oyment%20Agencies.doc;  France,  Dispositions 
legislatives propres au travail temporaire (Art. L. 124-
1 a L. 124-23), 1972, accessible at  http://www.euro-
ciett.org/fileadmin/templates/eurociett/docs/legal/franc
eapplicablelegislation.pdf;  India,  The  Inter-State 
Migrant  Workmen  (Regulation  of  Employment  and 
Conditions  of  Service)  Act,  1979,  accessible  at 
http://labour.delhigovt.nic.in/act/details_acts/interstate
migrnatwirkmen/index.html;  Ireland,  Employment 
Agency  Act,  1971,  accessible  at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1971/en/act/pub/0027/i
ndex.html; Morocco, Code du Travail, Livre IV, De 
Charges  to 
workers 
   Maximum fee of 
40 Swiss francs, 
commission of 5 
percent  of  first 
year's  salary. 
Value added tax 
charge  allowed. 
Range of 8-10% 
commission 
allowed  for 
musical 
performers. 
Inscription  tax 
charge  and 
supplemental 
remuneration 
from  employees 
to  cover  related 




abroad  are 
allowed. 
Commission 
charges  are 
established  by 
the  Swiss 
Federation 
Council 
l'Intermediation  en  matiere  de  recrutement  et 
d'embauche,  2003,  accessible  at  http://www.droit-
afrique.com/images/textes/Maroc/Maroc%20-
%20Code%20travail.pdf;  Peru,  Decreto  supremo  No 
005-2003-TR, Crean el Registro Nacional de Agencias 
Privadas  de  Empleo,  2003,  accessible  at 
http://www.mintra.gob.pe/contenidos/archivos/prodlab
/legislacion/DS_005_03_TR.pdf,  Resolucion 
Ministerial No 216-2004-TR, Aprueban directiva que 
regula el procedimiento para el Registro de Agencias 
Privadas  de  Empleos,  2004,  accessible  at 
http://www.mintra.gob.pe/contenidos/archivos/prodlab
/legislacion/RM_216_2004_TR.pdf,  Resolucion 
Ministerial  115-2007-TR,  Aprueban  Directiva  que 
regula  el  Procedimiento  para  la  inscripcion  en  el 
Registro Nacional de Agencias Privadas de Empleo, 
2007,  accessible  at 
http://www.mintra.gob.pe/intranet/contenidos/NL/RM
_151_2007_TR.pdf;  Singapore,  Employment 





deposit  or 
minimum 
capital 
      
Personal  & 
professional 
qualifications 
   Agencies  must 
be  operated  by 
individual  with 
Swiss  residence 
rights, 
professional 
qualifications,  a 
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good  reputation 
and  familiarity 
with  labor 
regulation  in 




South Africa, Skills Development Act No. 97, 1998, 




Ordonnance  sur  les  emoluments,  commissions  et 
suretes en vertu de la loi sur le service de l'emploi, 
1999,  accessible  at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/as/1999/2716.pdf,  Loi 
federale  sur  le  service  de  l'emploi  et  la  location  de 
services,  2008,  accessible  at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/8/823.11.fr.pdf;  United 
Kingdom,  The  Gangmasters  (Licensing)  Act,  2004, 
accessible  at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/ukpga_2004001
1_en_1. 
Validity  of 
license  and  re-
application 
   Fee  for  changes 
to license: 200 to 
800  Swiss 
francs, 
depending  on 
workload.  No 
expiration.  Only 
valid  in  certain 
countries. 
  
Scope  and 
transferability 
of license 
     The  regulation 
applies  to 
agricultural 
work,  gathering 
shellfish, 




produce  from 
agricultural 
work,  or 
packaging  fish 
or  products 
derived  from 
fish,  within  the 
United Kingdom 
or  adjacent 
shore,  seabed  or 
river.    License 
can  be 
transferred  with 
written  consent 
of Authority. 
Registration: 
other  business 
regulation  or 
tax authorities 
   Must 
"cooperate" with 
Swiss  public 
unemployment 
and  vocational 





Agreement  to 
comply  with 
labor and equal 
opportunity 
laws 
   Written 
contracts  must 
include character 
of the work, the 
place  of  work 
and  start  date, 
the  duration, 
work  hours, 
salary,  benefits, 
itemized 
deductions,  and 
the  date  of 
payment.  Other 
Swiss labor laws 
apply. 
  
Restrictions  on 
operations 
   Must  publish 
advertisements 
of  legitimate 
openings  under 
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their  own  name 
and address. 
Sanctions  The  Director 
General of Labor 
may  cancel 
registration if the 
agency  does  not 
comply  by  the 
rules. 
Licenses  can  be 
revoked  for 
providing  false 
or  misleading 
information, 
repeatedly  or 
seriously 
breaking  the 
terms  of  their 
license,  or 
failure  to  fulfill 
requirements. 
Unlicensed 
operation  is 
subject to a fine 
of  100,000 
Swiss francs and 
supplemental 
fines for illegally 
A  failure  to 
obtain  a  license 
could result in a 
maximum 
penalty  of  10 
years 
imprisonment 
and  a  fine  on 
conviction.  
The penalty for a 
Labour  User 
such as a farmer 
knowingly 
employing  an 
unlicensed 
Labour  Provider 
could result in a 
conviction of up 
to  6  months  in  
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placing  foreign 
workers.  
Employers 
knowingly  using 
an  unlicensed 
agency  subject 
to fine of 40,000 
Swiss  francs  (if 
unknowingly, 
then  20,000 
Swiss francs). 
Scotland  and 
Ireland  or  51 
weeks  in 
England and/or a 
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